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Introduction 
 
The Trouble with Suicide 
 
 
In 2006, almost three hundred people in Northern Ireland took their own lives. 
The number of suicides registered that year – 291 – was the highest ever 
recorded in Northern Ireland’s history and a marked increase on 2005. These 
suicides were among more than 6,000 across these islands, including 840 in 
Scotland and 500 in the Republic of Ireland. Very probably, the numbers were 
even higher because, as will be seen, some suicides are hidden. Whatever 
the figures, the totality of suicide represents a huge impact on families and 
communities, emotionally, socially, and financially. It also confronts public 
policy with major challenges, which is why many countries have developed 
dedicated suicide prevention strategies, and why much of the social science 
research reviewed in this report is carried out.  
 
The specific task of this review is to assess the evidence of the effects of the 
Northern Ireland conflict on mental health and well-being, with special 
reference to suicide. It is being carried out as part of the Suicide Prevention 
Strategy which recommends initial research on the topic, including finding out 
what if any relationship exists between the legacies of ‘the troubles’ and 
current suicide trends (Department of Health, Social Services and Public 
Safety, 2006). The Strategy also recommends research on the psychological 
profiling of deaths by suicide and an investigation into self-harm, some 
comments on which appear in this report. None of this is easy, as pointed out 
in the only attempt to cover this ground to date: ‘Such research in a sensitive 
political climate is fraught with ethical, methodological and interpretational 
problems’ (McWhirter, 2004: 37).  
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Private pain, public problem 
 
No death is ordinary to those immediately affected, but suicide is especially 
shocking. When someone takes their own life it is usually sudden and 
unexpected. Even with warning signs, no-one can anticipate the moment, as 
part of the determination to die is to ensure that the suicide is not thwarted. 
But often there is no warning and those left behind struggle to understand 
what happened. Could they have done something to pick up on the clues and 
to prevent the death? Did the person really mean to do it: a cry for help that 
went wrong? Was it designed to get back at people, an act of revenge that 
was meant to inflict pain on family, a lover or friends? Even suicide notes, if 
one is left, may raise more questions than answers. Why didn’t they ask for 
help and why was the help given not good enough? And why does suicide 
cause so much guilt, anger, shame, hurt, and – as in the case of ‘suicide 
bombers’ – either sympathy or utter hatred? Why people kill themselves is 
harder to explain, and to come to terms with at a personal level, than death 
through ageing or illness. Even ‘accidental deaths’ and murders do not attract 
the level of unresolved questions as raised by suicide, or leave quite the same 
legacy.1 
 
The big ‘why?’ questions are not at the centre of this report and it may be the 
case, as some survivors of suicide attempts have argued, that the only thing 
worth knowing is the depth of despair that drives a person to the closed, 
almost impregnable, depressive state of mind within which suicide becomes 
the only logical course of action. Certainly, the mass of academic research on 
suicide does not make the act any easier to bear at the personal level and this 
author would be the first to acknowledge that the Samaritans do more 
immediate good than any social science research project might achieve in the 
short-term. 
 
                                                
1 This is not to minimise the legacies of the Northern Ireland conflict-related deaths of recent decades. 
The £34m funding from 2005 to 2011 for the Historical Enquires Team to review thousands of killings, 
and the many campaigns for the truth around specific killings, together indicate the public and private 
legacies surrounding these deaths.  
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On the other hand, it is important to take the complexities of the social 
problem of suicide seriously, otherwise we are effectively colluding with the 
despair of the suicidal. While talk and support are the essential immediate 
responses to people at risk of suicide, more widely shared knowledge of the 
social and psychological background to suicide helps to relieve the sense of 
personal responsibility that surrounds it. If what defines suicide in a legalistic 
sense is the intent to kill oneself, then what fuels that intent is the central 
question. Only a part of this is in the control of individuals so there is a need to 
explore these influences systematically. This point is well understood by 
practitioners working in mental health and other public services, by policy 
makers and, of course, by researchers. But it is not a perspective that is 
universally shared, nor the main influence on public understanding and 
debate around suicide.  
 
The first problem is with the concept of intent. As Durkheim argued, ‘intent is 
too intimate a thing to be more than approximately interpreted by another’ 
(2002: xli). Some of those with serious intent to kill themselves, fail in the 
attempt, like the literary critic Al Alvarez. Conversely, some people who kill 
themselves may not have intended to do so – this has been argued in relation 
to the poet Sylvia Plath, as there is evidence that her suicide was carried out 
in such a manner that her intention was to be discovered and rescued. Others 
who lack intent and are often explicit about this, nevertheless engage in highly 
self-destructive behaviour, slowly killing themselves with alcohol and/or drugs 
– so-called ‘chronic suicides’, whose deaths would invariably not be officially 
registered as suicide. Still others, often preoccupied with depressive thoughts 
or stress, subconsciously kill themselves through momentary lapses of 
reason, concentration or willpower (Alvarez, 1974: 152-156). Most of these 
will be recorded as ‘accidental deaths’. Our ideas of what lies behind intent 
are further complicated by euthanasia, ‘advanced directives’, ‘living wills’ and 
the concept and practice of ‘assisted suicide’. There is a fine line between 
allowing and helping people to die and whether ‘suicide’ is the appropriate 
term in either case.  
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Durkheim’s definition of suicide avoids referring to intent and motive, and 
focuses instead on the idea that ‘the determining act is performed advisedly; 
that at the moment of acting the victim knows the certain result of his 
conduct’. So: 
the term suicide is applied to all cases of death resulting directly or 
indirectly from a positive or negative act of the victim himself, which he 
knows will produce this result. (Durkheim, 2002: xlii) 
But why be concerned about such distinctions and definitions or even about 
suicide at all? Contrary to mainstream opinion, the libertarian Thomas Szasz 
(1999) argues that the idea of suicide prevention within social policy rests of 
the false idea that suicide is a sickness. The ‘fatal freedom’ – the right of the 
individual to control their own death through suicide should not, he argues, be 
interfered with by doctors or psychiatrists. He labels suicide prevention 
services as ‘coercive’ because they deny the individual the choice of taking 
their own lives and he objects to ‘physician assisted suicide’ on similar 
grounds.  
 
 
Armed conflict and suicide 
 
A more recognisable form of coercion arises in the case of those who are 
‘driven’ to suicide through the physical or mental bullying, violence and 
intimidation of others – perhaps manslaughter or murder are more appropriate 
descriptions. For instance, one of the public debates in Northern Ireland 
around suicide concerns the role of paramilitary groups. The argument is that 
the growth of suicide among young men in North Belfast can be attributed 
directly to ‘punishment beatings’ (Sunday Life, 28 November 2004). During a 
debate on the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Bill in 1996, the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland referred to 167 punishment beatings 
taking place in 1995 and went on to name two suicides that followed such 
beatings (Mo Mowlam, Hansard, 9 January 1996, col. 46). In 2004, there is 
another reference in House of Commons debates in which suicide is framed 
in terms of paramilitary violence, this time by a Conservative MP:  
Introduction 
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The sad situation in Northern Ireland is that the punishment beatings, 
the racketeering, the exclusions and even the pressure towards suicide 
among young people have all got worse since the joint agreement. 
(Geoffrey Clifton-Brown, Hansard, 10 March 2004, col. 1608)  
Evidence on paramilitary beatings presented to the Northern Ireland Affairs 
Committee in 2001, however, made no mention of a link to suicide (Northern 
Ireland Affairs Committee, 2001).  
 
The oppressive conditions associated with conflict and war alter the way 
suicide intention is understood and sharpen public arguments about 
responsibility and motive. This is especially the case when suicide itself 
becomes an intrinsic part of warfare as in the case of the ‘Kamikaze’ missions 
of Japanese fighter pilots towards the end of World War II, or the ‘suicide 
bombers’ associated with more contemporary conflicts. As Gambetta (2005: 
265) shows, it is not easy to make sense of suicide missions given the variety 
of organisations, groups, targets and purposes involved. What is clear, 
however, is that suicide missions are easily condemned and this creates a 
climate in which it becomes more difficult to understand suicides that are not 
weapons of war but nonetheless arise from the conditions that wars bring 
about. For instance when three of those held in the Guantanamo Bay prison 
camps killed themselves in June 2006, the reaction of one US official was to 
describe the suicides as ‘a good PR move’, while the camp commander said, 
‘this was not an act of desperation, but an act of asymmetric warfare 
committed against us’.2 Relatives and human rights lawyers have questioned 
whether the three deaths were in fact suicides. Such controversies are now a 
common part of the international politics of political violence and armed 
conflicts. 
 
While ‘suicide missions’ were never a part of the tactics of the armed groups 
in the Northern Ireland conflict, the above debates have direct parallels. The 
most politicised public debate around the nature of suicide in Northern Ireland 
took place during the hunger strikes of 1981. On the one hand, the prisoners’ 
                                                
2  The first remark is attributed to Colleen Graffy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public 
Diplomacy (BBC News, 11th June 2006). There have been hundreds of self-harming incidents and over 
40 suicide attempts at the camps, including the simultaneous attempted suicide by 23 detainees in 
2003.  
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protest was dismissed as ‘self-inflicted’: ‘If the hunger strikers die as a result 
of their own action then it is through exercising their own free choice.’ 
(Robinson, 1981: 7) On the other hand, the government’s position of no 
concessions was attacked as tantamount to ‘murder’. Arguably, had the 
prisoners intended to kill themselves as a form of protest they would not have 
engaged in prolonged hunger strikes.3 Their deaths were not solely the result 
of the determination to stick to the protest as they could have been averted 
through concessions (Biggs, 2005: 174). Nor could the Catholic church go 
along with the idea that the protest was ‘suicide’, as Mitchell points out: ‘while 
the church tried to convince the prisoners to end the strike, it stopped short of 
labelling the strikes as suicide (an excommunicable sin)’ (2004: 249). 
 
Already we can see how the conflict has shaped public debate about suicide. 
When greater awareness of suicide emerged in the post-1998 Agreement 
period, the first response was to understand the problem through the 
traditional political dimensions of ‘the troubles’ rather than as a social problem 
in its own right. While ‘altruistic suicide’ is a common form of political protest 
throughout the world, political protests about suicide are unusual. But in the 
spring of 2005, community groups from North and West Belfast, fearing what 
was being described as an ‘epidemic’ of suicides among younger people in 
their neighbourhoods, began public protests to put pressure on service 
providers (Irish News, 27 April 2005), expressing frustration with the sluggish 
response of government to the problem. There were other actions, such as 
petitioning Belfast Council, designed to raise awareness and change the 
political debate on suicide (Daily Ireland, 18 February 2006). At one stage, the 
Health Minister Shaun Woodward, with an apparent reluctance to commit 
resources to the issue, stated: 
This is a special flavour to Northern Ireland. You take out a young man. 
You shoot him in the kneecaps or the ankles. He`ll never play sport 
again. His manhood feels destroyed. His self esteem - like his bones - is 
shattered. So when it comes to dealing with this problem [suicide] 
remember that with not a penny more if we could end the paramilitary-
style attacks on these young men, we`d start saving many of these lives 
                                                
3 For an account of Bobby Sands’ approach to the issues see O’Hearn (2006). 
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from tomorrow. If we could solve the problem with a cheque book it 
would have been done. (News Letter, 29 June 2005) 
The Minister had met with community groups and politicians a few days 
earlier and his remarks were widely seen as attributing the suicide problem to 
paramilitarism, in effect suggesting that the solution to the problem lay within 
the grasp of local communities and political leaders. As will be seen, this 
contrasts with an argument found in the research literature that ‘the troubles’ 
have had the effect of reducing suicide because local communities became 
more cohesive.  
 
The number of suicides resulting directly from the interrogation and 
punishment practices of loyalist and republican armed groups is not 
established. But the argument as stated is somewhat one-sided because it 
makes no reference to the mental health impacts of the conflict-related 
practices and regimes of the ‘law and order’ agencies for which governments 
are responsible – impacts on those working for such agencies, as well as on 
those they sought to control.  
 
 
The legacy of conflict 
 
At the outset, there are two principal arguments to consider about the 
relationship of ‘the troubles’ to mental health. The first is that the conflict has 
had only marginal effects on individuals and communities. While there were 
particular periods of intensity, notably the early 1970s, and while specific 
traumatic incidents and atrocities stand out, normality prevailed on the whole 
and most people – including children – were psychologically untroubled by 
events going on around them. This idea was at times reinforced by 
government campaigns emphasizing that the only pathological feature of 
Northern Ireland society was a relatively small number of individuals 
committed to terrorism.  
 
The second argument is that the conflict has had, and continues to have, 
deep and widespread effects because it has been the context of daily life and 
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experience for decades. Violent conflict has dominated politics, employment, 
residential space, and social and cultural activities to such an extent that there 
has been a profound psychological impact in at least two ways, argues 
Hamber (2004). One is what he calls the ‘politicisation of everyday life’ which 
means that no matter which side people are on, all sides of the political divide 
end up sanctioning violence. A culture of violence ‘seeps into everyday life’. 
The other is ‘a legacy of authoritarianism’ which, Hamber argues, is 
detectable at the level of the state, within communities and within individuals. 
The period of transition out of conflict therefore presents many psychological 
challenges as institutions and people come to terms with the legacies of the 
past, and develop new directions and frameworks for the future. The fatalism 
and restricted horizons associated with conditions of stalemated conflict give 
way to optimism and raised expectations, particularly in the aftermath of a 
peace agreement. These expectations may not be fulfilled, however, either at 
a social or individual level.  
  
The purpose of this review is to get behind the above headline debate on the 
degree to which the conflict has permeated Northern Irish society and affected 
mental well-being. While the debate cannot be settled as such, it can be 
informed by examining the evidence in relation to three main questions: 
1. To what extent has the Northern Ireland conflict contributed to, and 
exacerbated, the social factors and circumstances known to be 
associated with poor mental health?  
2. What research is there that identifies particular neighbourhoods and 
communities as high risk in terms of poor mental health and suicide? 
3. What is known about the prevalence of suicide risk factors among 
those individuals who were in the frontline of violence?  
The first task is to place suicide in the broad context of mental health and 
emotional well-being. Social scientists have become increasingly interested in 
understanding ‘positive’ as well as ‘negative’ mental health. This is reflected in 
the growth of research on ‘happiness’ which is discussed in the first part of 
Section 1. The somewhat undeveloped nature of this research means that 
little analysis of the links between violent conflict or political instability and 
mental well-being has been carried out. 
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In the second part of Section 1, studies that focus on the social factors 
affecting mental health are reviewed. The World Health Organisation’s survey 
of how class and gender shape mental health outcomes across many 
countries is a useful summary of the evidence. This provides a guide as to 
what might be expected in countries at various levels of development, 
especially regarding gender, depression and anxiety, the principal backdrop to 
suicide.   
 
Section 2 takes up the next question as to how these global patterns of 
mental health are further influenced by war, conflict and disasters, given the 
extreme situations that they bring about. Suicide comes into some of this 
research. Forced migration is the major theme because of its significance, 
often under-rated, to the Northern Ireland situation.  
 
This section of the report introduces the concept of trauma, giving some 
background to its development, measurement and application. The literature 
reveals two broad schools of thought on the recognition and management of 
trauma. The review highlights some of the difficulties of distinguishing 
between the effects of different dimensions of trauma, such as the experience 
of violence, economic insecurity, and homelessness. The brutalisation of 
women and children often arises out of the refugee experience, rather than 
war itself. 
  
The specific research evidence on the Northern Ireland conflict and mental 
health is covered in Section 3. Again, there are different arguments emerging 
from the research. One group of studies suggests widespread impacts on 
individuals and the society as a whole, while another sees the conflict as 
relatively insignificant: Northern Ireland itself is more normal than pathological, 
and traumatised individuals are few and far between. The discussion of this 
work is then followed by a presentation of the results from recent survey 
research on mental health and the conflict. 
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Section 4 turns to suicide specifically, beginning with the evidence on the 
relationship between suicide and mental health states, especially depression. 
It then tackles the problem of suicide statistics. There is a huge number of 
studies that look for statistical associations between suicide statistics and 
other data, whether psychologically or sociologically oriented. Most of these 
studies take the data for granted in the sense that national suicide statistics 
are a reliable record, both cross-sectionally and over time. The second part of 
Section 4 covers the analytical work challenging this assumption, and some of 
the empirical work that has shed light on the processes involved in creating 
suicide statistics.  
 
A brief review of data on self-harming follows. Measures of self-harm are not 
well-developed but the available surveys and trends are described. 
 
Suicide patterns and trends are examined in Section 5. Using World Health 
Organisation data, the international patterns of suicide are discussed in some 
detail, drawing out distinctive age profiles, gender ratios and fluctuations in 
trends. This provides clues on how the marked differences between countries 
should be understood, as well as allowing the Northern Ireland position to be 
put into perspective.  
 
The emphasis then shifts towards Britain and Ireland. A number of charts are 
presented to assist the discussion of trends. Some of these go beyond the 
literature in the sense that they are compiled from data presented in the 
research as well as from the raw data published in annual reports of the 
Registrar General. 
 
Detailed analysis of suicides in Northern Ireland is presented in Section 6. 
This discusses age and gender, as well as the available evidence on mental 
health backgrounds, treatment status, employment, class and social isolation. 
The section ends with a brief look at the data on method of suicide. 
 
Section 7 draws together the principal explanations for Northern Ireland’s 
suicide trends.  It starts with the evidence on suicide and the equality 
Introduction 
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dimensions covered under Section 75 of the 1998 Northern Ireland Act and 
explores recent sociological studies of suicide and social isolation.  
 
One of the most important and relevant generalisations about suicide for this 
review is the notion that war helps to hold suicide rates down and when peace 
is established, rates of suicide rise. This proposition is closely scrutinised in 
Section 7, both theoretically and in terms of available evidence for Northern 
Ireland and elsewhere. Registrar General data is used to raise questions 
about the assumed association between conflict-related deaths and deaths 
from suicide.   
 
Finally, Section 8 covers suicide and the transition to peace. The arguments 
around social and political integration are considered before discussing the 
research evidence for relationships between suicide, experience of the 
conflict, neighbourhoods and specific groups who were in the frontline of ‘the 
troubles’. Consumption of alcohol and drugs is discussed. The patchy 
evidence on the mental health of those in the frontline of conflict is examined, 
followed by a brief discussion of mental health services. 
 
The main conclusions of the review and some recommendations for how 
knowledge gaps might be remedied are presented in Section 9. The method 
for carrying out the review is described in the Appendix. 
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Section 1 
 
The Social Basis of Mental Well-being 
 
 
Well-being and happiness 
 
It is now widely accepted that mental health and well-being cannot simply be 
defined in terms of the absence of mental illnesses and disorders. There may 
be low levels of depression or suicide recorded for a country but this may not 
equate with high levels of subjective well-being or ‘happiness’. Conversely, 
the ‘happiest country on earth’ (Denmark) (BBC News 28th July 2006)  has a 
relatively high rate of recorded suicide and high levels of consumption of 
mood stabilising drugs such as lithium (Kessing et al, 2005). 
 
Measures of well-being and happiness are a relatively recent addition to the 
discussion of mental health and vary considerably in approach. Most 
happiness indexes rely on survey evidence and popular responses to one or 
two key questions. Since 1946, for example, the North American General 
Social Survey, has asked ‘[…] would you say that you are very happy, pretty 
happy, or not too happy?’. The Eurobarometer Survey, from the early 1970s, 
poses the issue in terms of ‘satisfaction’: ‘on the whole, are you very satisfied, 
fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?’ 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). The World Values Survey, which began in 
1981 and for which four waves have now been carried out, asks ‘Taking all 
things together, would you say you are very happy, quite happy, not very 
happy or not at all happy?’.  The survey, which has included Northern Ireland 
as a separate entity in three of the waves, also asks about general 
satisfaction with life, a range of mood and motivation-type questions, and 
about how much autonomy and control people feel they have, providing a rich 
source of data relating perception of life to people’s material position, work, 
family life and social networks (World Values Survey).  
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Happiness data have been of particular interest to economists because of the 
observation that in rich countries, as standards of living continue to increase, 
people seem to be no happier (Layard, 2005: 29-34). The World Values 
Survey data do show, however, that richer countries are generally happier 
than poorer ones and that ‘the effect of income on happiness is greatest in the 
poorest countries, where people are nearest the breadline’ (Layard, 2005: 33). 
Within richer countries, there are significant differences in happiness levels 
according to income and status.  
 
Blanchflower and Oswald explored well-being over time in Britain and the 
USA and concluded that, overall, reported levels of well-being had declined in 
the USA and remained flat in Britain.  But this was an average result. 
Particular groups, ‘such as American men and blacks’, have become happier 
over the last three decades, narrowing white/black differences. Nevertheless, 
black people in the USA remain much less happy than whites. Women, 
married people, the highly educated and those whose parents did not divorce 
report the highest well-being, although ‘it is women rather than men who are 
experiencing the decline in well-being’ (2004: 1366). The authors conclude by 
suggesting that their method of analysis may provide ‘a new way to document 
the existence of discrimination’ (2004: 1381). 
 
Using data for 65 societies and a pooled sample of 146,000 respondents, 
Inglehart (2002) shows that the gender effect is age-related. Younger women 
are happier than younger men but the reverse is true for older women. The 
push for gender equality does not appear to have compensated for the 
‘systematic tendency to devalue older women’. 
 
Borooah (2006) plotted results for some 80 countries, including scores for 
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, using the World Values Survey 
data (from the 1999 to 2002 wave). Of the 19 countries with the lowest mean 
happiness score, all bar two (Iran and Zimbabwe) were from the former 
countries of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc. Lithuania, the 
country with one of the highest rates of recorded suicide in the world, had the 
fifteenth lowest mean happiness score but a moderately low ‘unhappiness 
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rate’ (based on the proportion who reported being ‘not at all happy’). The 
result for Northern Ireland appears to be polarized between happiness and 
unhappiness. Northern Ireland’s mean happiness (12th happiest out of 80 with 
a score of 8.48) was sandwiched between Denmark (with a score of 8.49) and 
Ireland (at 8.45). In terms of unhappiness Northern Ireland’s rating is the 
same as that for Bangladesh, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Argentina, 
Sweden and Germany.4 Romania and Bulgaria have the highest rate of 
unhappiness with a score of 12. 
 
Borooah’s main interest was to adjust the mean happiness scores to take 
account of the degree of inequality in a country. This had some effect on the 
rankings, for instance pushing Turkey down ten places and New Zealand up 
four places – Northern Ireland moved up slightly to tenth equal with Vietnam. 
 
The World Database of Happiness shows that Northern Ireland became 
slightly unhappier during the 1980s and early 1990s (Veenhoven, n.d.). Using 
a ten-item balanced scale, Northern Ireland’s mean score went down from 
1.86 to 1.69 (out of a possible +5). This contrasts with the Irish Republic 
where the score rose from 1.63 to 2.0 between 1981 and 1990.  Great Britain 
began the period with a much lower score (1.4) but improved this to 1.7 by 
1991. On the single happiness question, however, Great Britain was slightly 
less happy in 2005 than in 1981. The same is true for the Irish Republic. 
Northern Ireland’s happiness went down during the 1980s but rose against 
the trend between 1991 and 1999 (from 3.28 to 3.42 on a four point scale). 
 
The country-wide finding on the coexistence of unhappiness and happiness is 
noted in the recent survey of mental health across the European Union 
(European Commission, 2004: 20-22). The report shows that positive mental 
health scores are found alongside low psychological distress levels in some 
countries (e.g. the Netherlands) while the opposite is the case for others. Italy, 
Portugal and France have low levels of positive mental health and high levels 
of psychological distress. But Spain and Belgium are high for positive mental 
                                                
4 On a 12-point scale, Northern Ireland’s unhappiness value was 2 compared to Ireland’s 1 and 
Denmark’s 0. Lithuania scored 3, as did Greece, South Africa, Pakistan and China. 
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health and relatively high for psychological distress. 
 
 
Conflict and happiness 
 
It would be reasonable to argue that Northern Ireland’s happiness trends were 
related in some way to the conflict, the assumption being that less conflict 
from the mid-1990s onwards, coupled with the 1998 political agreement, are 
responsible for the observed improvement in overall happiness. To a degree 
the subjective measure of happiness fits with changes in levels of violence. 
Conflict-related killings declined sharply after the ceasefires of 1994 with the 
exception of the period leading up to and around the 1998 Agreement itself. 
Other types of violence – punishment attacks, shootings, bombings, and 
housing intimidation – increased post-Agreement, however (Shirlow and 
Murtagh, 2006: 51-56). This suggests a more complex relationship between 
violent conflict and impacts on mental well-being, and the need for a model 
that can take account of the juxtaposition of relatively high levels of happiness 
and unhappiness.  
 
Conflicts may impact more heavily on some geographical areas than others 
within a national or regional entity. Similarly, specific groups within a 
population are likely to be more affected than others. This literature review 
has not been able to find research that relates happiness measures 
specifically to levels of violent conflict within (or between) countries. Friends of 
the Earth’s Happy Planet Index (HPI), which combines life expectancy scores 
with ‘life satisfaction’ and ‘environmental footprint’, shows that life satisfaction 
does relate to general political conditions in a country but this is a relatively 
loose measure of prevailing democratic freedoms rather than political 
instability and conflict as such.  
 
The HPI also discusses the negative impacts of war and conflict in specific 
regions and countries. Central America, for example, is the best region in the 
Index. While it has had ‘a notorious history of conflict and political instability’, 
for the past fifteen years there has been greater stability which, combined with 
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a high level of community engagement, results in high scores for life 
satisfaction for countries across the region (New Economics Foundation 2006: 
4). Central America combines high life expectancy with high life satisfaction 
and a relatively low ecological footprint. Hence Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, El Salvador and Cuba are all in the top ten whereas the UK and 
Ireland rank 108th and 113th respectively. Denmark sits at 99, while Zimbabwe 
lies at 178, the unhappiest part of the planet. 
 
Political instability and conflict will lead to a fall in average happiness insofar 
as they can be shown, in any specific instance, to contribute to instability in 
employment, higher rates of unemployment, and marriage breakdown. Such 
causation is credible given that conflict on any serious scale typically involves 
damage and distortion to the economy, population movements, whether of 
‘refugees’ or ‘internally displaced persons’, and disruptions to the fabric of 
family and community life occasioned by the recruitment of civilians into 
military forces.  
 
 
The social basis of mental health 
 
If happiness research has not as yet focused on political instability and conflict 
as explanatory variables,5 it has at least shown that variations in happiness 
are strongly associated with unemployment, job insecurity and breakdown of 
family and community relationships through separation and divorce (Layard, 
2005: 62-70). In order of importance, according to data from the USA, family 
relationships come first followed by ‘financial situation’ and work. If a person is 
separated or divorced they are likely to be scoring around ten per cent lower 
on happiness measures than people who are married.  
 
The new work on happiness adds to the substantial body of evidence that 
mental health and emotional well-being are shaped by social factors and the 
stresses associated with economic and social insecurities of all kinds. Social 
                                                
5 There are at least two ‘political stability’ indexes that might be used for such an analysis: Kaufmann et 
al (2003) and Annett (2001).  
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and economic contexts are also key to the prospects for recovery from mental 
illness (Webber, 2005). Wallcraft (2005) found that, in addition to gaining 
access to appropriate treatments and therapies, the most important factors 
helping recovery were good relationships, financial security and satisfying 
work (or education and training opportunities), and ‘self-management of 
problems’, or autonomy. Although family relationships were important, it was 
the quality of personal relationships in providing closeness, emotional support, 
companionship and practical support that really counted and often such 
supports were supplied outside the family. 
 
While it is not straightforward to demonstrate direct causal links between 
social and psychological factors, there is increasing evidence of the 
importance of ‘psychosocial pathways’ in linking social circumstances, notably 
income inequalities, to a wide range of physical and mental health problems 
and premature death (Wilkinson, 1996). The World Health Organisation 
reviewed evidence on the prevalence of mental illnesses by socio-economic 
position and showed that in many countries, the poorest groups have twice 
the risk of high income groups. For depression alone, the low versus high 
income group ratio was 1.6:1 for Ethiopia, the Netherlands and USA, and 
1.9:1 for Finland and Germany. The same report noted that ‘the overall 
prevalence of mental and behavioural disorders does not seem to be different 
between men and women’ (World Health Organisation, 2001: 40-1).  
 
For anxiety and depression, however, there are significant differences by 
gender. The women-to-men prevalence ratio is typically between 1.5:1 and 
2:1 across developed and developing countries. Men have a higher 
prevalence of substance use and antisocial personality disorders. Gender 
differences in depression are found to be strongly age-related: ‘the greatest 
differences occur in adult life, with no reported differences in childhood and 
few in the elderly’ (WHO, 2001: 41).  
 
One important factor behind women’s higher risk of anxiety and depression is 
intimate partner violence (domestic violence), the main burden of which falls 
on women. Lifetime prevalence of intimate partner violence ranges between 
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16 and 50 per cent according to the available global evidence. In a survey 
across 35 developed countries, between 10 and 30 per cent of women 
reported they had experienced sexual violence by an intimate partner. 
Between 10 and 27 per cent of women and girls reported having been 
sexually abused, either as children or adults (cited in World Health 
Organization, 2005: 1). A more recent study collected data from over 24,000 
women from ten countries representing a range of cultural settings, including 
Bangladesh, Brazil, Ethiopia and Thailand. The proportion of women who had 
ever experienced physical or sexual violence ranged from 15 per cent in 
Japan (one city) to 71 per cent in Ethiopia (one province). It was found that 
almost one third of the Ethiopian women in the sample had been physically 
forced to have sex within the last year, a finding which is ‘particularly alarming 
in the light of the AIDS epidemic’ (WHO, 2005: 7). Of the reported sexual 
violence, about half was based on degrading or humiliating sexual 
behaviours, and fear of what a partner might do if sex was refused, rather 
than physical force as such.  Furthermore, there is a clear relationship 
between physical and sexual violence, and controlling behaviours and 
emotional abuse.6  
 
As indicated, intimate partner violence is associated with emotional distress 
including chronic levels of fatigue, overwork, inability to enjoy life, anxiety and 
depression. As a result, women are more likely than men to be prescribed, 
and using, psychotropic drugs. In the UK, Italy, Germany, Canada and the 
USA, the ratio is over 2:1; in France it is close to 4:1 (WHO, 2001: 15)7   
These dimensions of poor mental health also feed into suicidal thoughts and 
behaviour. Although in most countries men are much more likely than women 
to take their own lives, women who have experienced intimate partner 
violence are much more likely to report that they have contemplated suicide 
than those who have not experienced such violence.8 
                                                
6 Such controlling behaviours include keeping the partner from seeing friends, restricting contact with 
family, frequently accusing a partner of being unfaithful and insisting on knowing where a partner is all 
the time. 
7 High and low estimates are given for different countries and the higher estimates are quoted here. 
8 Figures vary rather widely. Of women reporting that they had thought of suicide, the ratio of those who 
had experienced intimate partner violence to those who had not, was 11:1 for Indonesia, 8.7:1 for Egypt, 
3.5:1 for Chile, 4.3:1 for India, and 3:1 for Japan (one city) WHO (2001: 42) and WHO (2005: 16). 
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Section 2 
 
Mental Illness, Conflicts and Disasters 
 
 
There is growing interest in the mental health impacts of violent conflicts and 
disasters. According to the World Health Organization, conflicts and disasters 
have similar effects in that large numbers of people are displaced from their 
homes, communities and livelihoods. Around 50 million people globally are 
refugees or have been ‘internally displaced’ as a result of war. Many more 
millions are coping with the effects of earthquakes, floods and hurricanes, and 
‘such situations take a heavy toll on the mental health of the people involved, 
most of whom live in developing countries, where capacity to take care of 
these problems is extremely limited. Between a third and half of all the 
affected persons suffer from mental distress.’ WHO (2001: 43)  Even in 
wealthy countries, disasters have major affects on mental stress and illness. 
Hurricane Katrina, which struck New Orleans in August 2005, led to a 
doubling of both ‘mild-moderate’ and serious mental illness. (Kessler, 2006)  
Suicide ideation fell to very low levels, however, a result that the researchers 
compare to Beirut during the first Lebanon–Israel war where high prevalence 
of depression was observed alongside low suicide ideation. They suggest that 
negative mental health effects of disasters and wars may be offset with 
respect to suicide by a growth in personal resilience, social support and other 
protective factors. 
 
The literature on the relationship between wars, conflicts and mental ill-health 
focuses on two main themes. The first concerns the population displacement 
effects of conflicts and disasters, including problems of adjusting to, and 
getting established in, new locations. The second theme focuses on the direct 
effects on combatants and civilians of  violence and human rights abuses, 
such as torture. 
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Displacement and mental health 
 
De Jong’s comprehensive survey of the literature, which refers to 
‘approximately 175 epidemiological studies on the mental health 
consequences of wars and conflicts’, begins by charting the scale of global 
population movements up to 1999. By that year there were around 13.5 
million refugees and a further 20 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
because of armed conflicts (De Jong, 2002: 2-5).  The World Refugee Survey 
for 2006 shows that a further 1.04 million refugees and asylum seekers were 
created in 2005, as well as 2.1 million new IDPs, bringing the current total to 
21 million (U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2006).  The highest 
numbers of refugees are in the Middle East where close to 5 million people 
are displaced. More than 800,000 refugees from Iraq are living in Jordan and 
Syria. Iran and Pakistan have taken in more than two million refugees from 
Afghanistan. There are well over three million refugees in Africa. Europe, in 
contrast, had an estimated 530,000 refugees in 2005. Around three-quarters 
of refugees and displaced persons are women and children. Up to five per 
cent are orphaned children.  
 
Clearly, children are the most exposed to harm and exploitation in conflict and 
disaster situations: ‘armed conflict alters their lives in direct and indirect ways, 
and in addition to the risk of being killed or injured, they can be orphaned, 
abducted, subjected to sexual violence or left with deep emotional scars and 
psychosocial trauma from direct exposure to violence, dislocation, poverty 
and the loss of loved ones’ (Baingana et al, 2005: 12).   In some conflicts, 
children have been forced into military service and to kill a parent or 
community member (Mozambique and Uganda). Anne Kielland’s taxonomy of 
OVC – Orphaned and Vulnerable Children – identifies an estimated 30 million 
OVC in sub-Saharan Africa as a result of HIV/AIDS and a further 7 million 
children affected by armed conflict.9 HIV/AIDS is an established risk factor for 
suicide (Starace, 1995).  
 
                                                
9 See Anne Kielland’s presentation available from the World Bank at 
info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/164047/pdf/ovc.pps 
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Recent refugees and displaced persons face particular stresses and 
adjustments as they seek to survive and then establish themselves in new 
situations, often in refugee camps. Conflict and relocation,  
can have a profound effect on the mental health of affected 
populations, whether they are refugees, IDPs, asylum seekers or 
others trying to rebuild their lives and communities. The transition 
entails coming to grips with what has occurred and adjusting to life in 
new environments that may feel foreign and inhospitable. It may also 
mean impoverishment due to loss of assets and livelihoods, uncertainty 
regarding the status of loved ones, unemployment and a lack of skills 
suitable for the new location and circumstances. (Baingana et al, 2005: 
6) 
Unsurprisingly, there is evidence of displaced adults feeling useless and 
hopeless. Studies of refugee populations that have applied tests for ‘post-
traumatic stress disorder’ (PTSD) show that rates of depression and trauma 
are much higher than would be expected in the general population across a 
range of contexts, such as in Mollica et al’s findings for Cambodia and Bosnia 
(1998; 2001).  
 
Since the 1950s, the main tool for assessing mental ill-health has been the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), developed by 
the American Psychiatric Association. Version III of DSM was published in 
1980 and included for the first time a definition of PTSD. In DSM IV, PTSD is 
defined as an anxiety disorder of at least one month duration. The recent 
prominence of PTSD in psychiatric discourse comes in part from its 
acceptance in military and government circles: US war veterans may receive 
compensation on the basis of a PTSD diagnosis. Fifteen per cent of all male 
Vietnam veterans were diagnosed with PTSD in the mid-1980s and one half 
of these had been in trouble with the law. About one third of the veterans 
diagnosed with PTSD (over 160,000) were in receipt of disability 
compensation. Of those in the US military serving in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
slightly higher proportions have been diagnosed with PTSD (Epstein and 
Miller, 2005; Baingana et al, 2005: 7-8).    
 
De Jong argues that ‘the long-term sequelae of war traumas have been 
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underestimated. Thirty to 45 years after a war, a large proportion of veterans 
were still suffering from PTSD and were at an increased mortality risk from 
tuberculosis, accidents, or coronary heart disease… Time per se does not 
necessarily heal wounds for a considerable amount of people.’ (De Jong, 
2002: 42)  The nightmares, anxiety, depression, anger, sleeplessness and 
aggression associated with highly stressful situations and experiences may, 
therefore, continue for many years, depending on the new situation, supports 
and opportunities. A study of refugees who lived through the Pol Pot regime in 
Cambodia and who settled in the USA prior to 1993, found that 90 per cent 
had experienced near death due to starvation and the same proportion had 
lost a friend or relative in the ‘killing fields’. The refugees were surveyed 
between 2003 and 2005, and almost two-thirds were scoring highly for PTSD 
and a half for ‘major depression’. Although revealing a strong prima facie 
need for mental health services, the study did not collect information on the 
prevalence of mental health treatment within the sample. (Marshall, 2005)   
There is also evidence of persistent adverse mental health symptoms among 
Mandaean refugees (from Iraqi and Iran) three years after being released 
from detention in Australia, although the uncertainties and conditions of the 
detention regime itself were shown to be the cause of ill-health, rather than 
the experience of pre-migration trauma as such. (Steel et al, 2006)   
 
Refugees may anticipate returning to their place of origin but often they 
remain in camps for years. The U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 
publishes details of populations of 10,000 or more where people are restricted 
to camps or segregated in settlements, or otherwise deprived of basic rights, 
in situations lasting five years or more.  At the end of 2005, almost eight 
million people were recorded as being in this position and for seven million of 
these, the situation had lasted ten years or more (U.S. Committee for 
Refugees and Immigrants, 2006: 10).   The regimes of refugee camps, 
whether controlled initially by international relief agencies or by the host 
country, often amount to prison-like warehousing. Rather than assisting 
independence and autonomy, and respecting cultural practices and assets, 
camps and reception centres induce helplessness, ‘especially in those camps 
that reproduce the  authoritarian regimes from which the refugees escaped, 
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possibly reproduced by the militaristic approach of some relief agencies or 
peacekeepers.’ (De Jong, 2002: 76).  A study of Sudanese refugees in 
northern Uganda found that stress factors accumulated well beyond the first 
few years following flight from war. The poverty and dependency associated 
with camp life caused many to lose hope. Some refugee settlements were 
plagued by rebel attacks and new traumatic experiences. By the time the 
Uganda Government and UNHCR adopted a plan to move refugees from 
camps to settlement sites, suicide and alcohol overuse had become 
significant problems (Baron, 2002). 
 
 
Conflict and trauma 
   
The second theme in the literature focuses on the conflict, violence and 
human rights abuses, such as torture, experienced by civilians and 
combatants.  A review carried out for the World Bank found considerable 
evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety and depression 
arising directly from violent experiences which, typically, impact widely. A 
survey of 750,000 people in East Timor found that 22 per cent had witnessed 
the killing of a family member or friend, one quarter had been hit on the head, 
a third reported being beaten and 40 per cent had been psychologically 
tortured (Baingana et al, 2005: 5).  Violence is often gender-based, involving 
the rape and mutilation of women, with ‘scars of brutality so extreme that 
survival seemed for some a worse fate than death’ (Rehn and Sirleaf, 2002: 
9). Harassment, intimidation, forced displacement and fear associated with 
unexploded land mines, cluster bombs and other ordnance, all contribute to 
psychological insecurity and, overall, ‘the psychiatric literature shows that 
conflict situations increase disorder prevalence’ (Baingana et al, 2005: 5).   
 
Unlike refugees, internally displaced persons do not have a defined status 
under international law although the Secretary General of the United Nations 
appointed a Representative on IDPs in 1992 in recognition of the growing 
scale of the problem. As was shown above, IDPs now outnumber refugees 
and such is the scale of human rights violations that in 2004 the UN appointed 
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a Representative on the Human Rights of IDPs. There were two major policy 
developments at the international level with respect to IDPs in 1998. First, the 
Commission on Human Rights adopted the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement which refer to the right to ‘mental and moral integrity’. There is 
explicit recognition of the need for ‘psychological and social services’ and the 
special health needs of women ‘including access to female health care 
providers and services, such as reproductive health care, as well as 
appropriate counselling for victims of sexual and other abuses’.10   The 
second development was that the Norwegian Refugee Council established 
the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). This works closely with 
the UN and provides regularly updated country and regional reports and 
statistics. The number of IDPs in Iraq, for example, was estimated to be 1.6 
million in October 2006. India has approximately 600,000 IDPs while Sri 
Lanka has half a million. But Africa is worst affected: half of the world’s IDPs 
are in Africa, with over five million in Sudan alone, a further two million in 
Uganda, a million in Algeria and 1.5 miilion in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. 
 
In some conflicts it is not easy to separate the effects of traumatic 
experiences of violence from the context of displacement, economic insecurity 
and social fragmentation. Furthermore, some countries experience extreme 
cocktails of violent conflict and ‘natural’ disasters. Sri Lanka has lost 
approximately 65,000 people to the civil war that has ebbed and flowed since 
the early 1980s, with 3,300 killed during the first nine months of 2006 – almost 
as many as were killed in Northern Ireland’s conflict over thirty years. A 
quarter of a million IDPs have been added to the total during 2006. The 
country was also badly affected by the December 2004 tsunami which made 
over half a million homeless. The latest country report from the Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre states that the degree of overlap between 
conflict and disaster-related IDPs is unknown. Whatever the scale and nature 
of displacement, however, ‘the psycho-social effects of the conflict are 
                                                
10 Principles 11 and 19 of Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/idp/standards.htm 
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serious, leading to increased levels of suicide’ (Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre, 2005: 125.   By 2000, Sri Lanka was thought to have one 
of the highest suicide rates in the world. But in the ‘welfare centres’ where 
some of the IDPs have resided for long periods, the suicide rate is three times 
the country average (2005: 98)  
 
Inevitably, systematic evidence of the psychological impacts of civil war and 
communal conflict in extreme circumstances such as those pertaining in Sri 
Lanka is patchy or based on small samples from local communities 
(Somasunundaram and Jamunanantha, 2002: 231).  But the real difficulty is 
the use of culturally specific concepts and diagnostic tools, with particular 
debate surrounding post-traumatic stress disorder (De Jong, 2002: 40-1).   A 
study carried out in Cambodia as part of a community mental health 
programme found that all respondents had experienced several traumatic 
events. However, reactions were varied: ‘some showed symptoms, such as 
recurrent nightmares, consistent with the PSTD criteria. Many more, however, 
showed crippling complaints such as “heat in the head”, “stabbing in the 
abdomen”, “thinking too much” … Cases could be divided into three 
categories… Roughly 20 per cent had a physical illness, 35 per cent had a 
psychiatric problem, and 45 per cent can be described as having psychosocial 
problems’ (Van de Put and Eisenbruch, 2002: 102).  As Summerfield argues,  
although post-traumatic stress disorder is reported to be prevalent 
worldwide in populations affected by war, the assumption that a 
Western diagnostic entity captures the essence of human response to 
such events anywhere, regardless of personal, social and cultural 
variables, is problematic. Features of post-traumatic stress disorder are 
often epiphenomenal and not what survivors are attending to or 
consider important: most of them remain active and effective in the 
face of continuing hardship and threat. Thus uncritical application of 
diagnostic checklists for post-traumatic stress disorder may generate 
large overestimates of the numbers needing treatment. (Summerfield, 
2000: 231)    
 
Critique of ‘Trauma’ 
 
In a forceful critique of the ‘globalisation of trauma’ and the ‘medicalisation of 
distress’ Summerfield argues that PTSD checklists potentially turn functioning, 
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coping and resilient individuals into medical ‘cases’. His own experience of 
examining over 800 asylum seekers and refugees while working for the 
Medical Foundation11  led him to conclude that the vast majority were upset 
but not ill (Summerfield, 2004).  The clinical evidence does not deny that war-
related trauma has serious psychological effects for some individuals who 
would benefit from professional medical intervention. But he argues that 
‘survivor populations’ will be able to manage suffering and recovery most 
successfully through a focus on rehabilitation: ‘this means an overall approach 
which locates the quest of victims for rights and justice as a central and not 
peripheral issue’ (Summerfield, 1996: 4; Summerfield, 2005: 50).  A focus on 
individual models of treatment based on early intervention and re-visiting 
traumatic events, may do more harm than good, he argues.  
 
Similar critical arguments have been developed in the Northern Ireland 
context by Gilligan (2006) using a sociological framework. Gilligan identifies 
and critiques core assumptions about peace, trauma and conflict. He 
concludes: 
Therapists cannot adequately answer the question ‘what was it all for?’ 
because it requires a political or moral answer…The introspective, 
individualised and depoliticised approach to dealing with political 
violence is inherently self-limiting and may even serve to undermine 
peace-building efforts by promoting a view of the human subject as 
inherently vulnerable and in need of professional support. (2006: 339) 
There is some recognition of these criticisms in the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Co-operation’s recently published toolkit on gender and 
conflict transformation (2006).  This is committed to addressing trauma and 
the psychosocial legacies of conflict but in the context of UN resolution 1325 
on women, peace and security, and an overall emphasis on empowerment. 
The toolkit explicitly criticises the PTSD approach:   
any approach that reduces trauma to a mental or physical pathology 
must be strictly avoided… Its [PTSD’s] main drawback is that it reduces 
trauma to a disease of the individual, like any other. PTSD thus ignores 
and dislocates the relationship between individual suffering and the 
                                                
11 The London-based Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims was founded in 1985 and 
provides care and rehabilitation to survivors of torture and other forms of organised violence. 
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political context, thereby adding to the marginalization and 
victimisation’. (2006: 16)   
The toolkit provides many examples of how, through directly involving those 
caught up in disasters and conflict in practical actions to rebuild economic and 
social activity, appropriate opportunities will arise to address the trauma, to 
prevent opportunities for the exploitation of women and children, and to 
generate the collective self-confidence needed to secure peace and 
reconstruction. In short, ‘empowerment is not limited to developing more 
positive feelings about oneself and gaining insight into one’s situation. It also 
means doing something about it.’ (2006: 18) 
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 Section 3 
 
Northern Ireland, Conflict and Mental Health 
 
 
While the scale of conflicts and disasters referred to above far outstrips the 
Northern Ireland experience, there remain important parallels. In societies 
characterised by military conflict of whatever scale, the sources of everyday 
stress and uncertainty are considerably magnified, for example, through 
unexpected disruptions of  daily routines, forced migrations, loss of jobs and 
the shocks of death and injury. Violent conflicts, particularly civil wars, have 
well-documented impacts on economic activity, causing ‘development in 
reverse’, capital flight and high levels of military expenditure (Collier et al, 
2003).   Unemployment and poverty typically increase and fewer resources 
are devoted to health services, trends that sometimes continue long after the 
cessation of hostilities. The available evidence on the impact of the conflict on 
economic development, physical infrastructure public expenditure 
programmes, policing and punishment, forced migration, segregation of 
housing and schools, labour market participation, health and well-being, was 
reviewed as part of a study of the relationship between poverty and conflict 
(Hillyard, et al, 2005: 109-120). Not only have there been surprisingly few 
attempts to assess the overall economic and social costs of the conflict, but 
also there has been little analysis of how those costs are borne as between 
private individuals and households, the voluntary sector, business and 
commerce, and the public sector.  
 
Mental ill-health is interesting in this respect as it is a private hurt that impacts 
on immediate relationships but also on wider roles. Poor mental health is 
costly for employers and state services. It also acts as a barrier to post-
conflict reconstruction, especially when, as some have argued, the whole 
society has been traumatized by violence. In this view, the ‘troubled mind’ of 
Northern Ireland is dominated by an emotional intensity that resonates from 
the interpersonal to the political (Kapur and Campbell, 2004). Northern Irish 
society, so the argument runs, is pathological; it has become ‘dehumanized’ 
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and ‘day-to-day societal relations are infected by destructive processes’ 
(2004: xiii).  This somewhat speculative application of psycho-analytical 
concepts leads the authors to suggest that ‘the poor state of [physical] health 
in Northern Ireland represents a somatization of years of exposure to the 
intense emotional effects of the Troubles’ (2004: 94).  
 
Earlier, it was established that population displacement is one of the most 
important consequences of conflicts. Enforced population movements in the 
context of Ireland’s recent experience are of course on a smaller scale than 
most of the examples given above, but no less significant in terms of the 
human impact. But they are poorly researched. One recent assessment 
states: ‘intimidation, displacement and migration have occurred on a massive 
scale, leading to increased social segregation’ (Hillyard et al, 2005: 113). In 
the 1969-72 period, an estimated 60,000 people were forced out of their 
homes, some crowding into West Belfast and other areas, and some leaving 
Northern Ireland altogether (Darby and Morris, 1974). Hundreds crossed the 
border in 1969 and became the responsibility of the Department of Defence 
and the Irish Army. In August 1971, over 2,800 refugees from the North were 
received into an Army camp in Co. Meath. A similar number were being 
looked after in police premises, schools, community centres and hospitals, 
mainly in border areas but also in Cork and Dublin. In 1972, 9,800 refugees 
were received (Rahaleen, 2005: 24-32). Then, after the initial crisis the 
refugee issue disappeared from public policy discussion, until resurfacing with 
the peace process and the EU Peace Programmes. The most recent estimate 
of the prevalence of displacement within Northern Ireland found that 54,000 
households have been forced to move because of attack, intimidation or 
harassment (Hillyard, et al, 2003: 62).  
 
Recent qualitative research with displaced people in the Southern border 
counties found that, while people had eventually become well-established in 
terms of work and housing, they were still haunted by the original refugee 
experience, including they way they were resented as outsiders and 
‘northerners’. In particular, ‘the hurt at separation has not reduced over time 
and interviewees continue to this day to feel a void, or absence, or regret at 
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being away from their extended family’ (Rahaleen, 2005: 97).   
 
Other aspects of the international debate about conflict and trauma are better 
reflected in the literature on Northern Ireland. On the one hand, some of the 
earliest assessments carried out during the worst years of the conflict 
suggested strong affects on anxiety and depression (Lyons, 1971; Fraser, 
1971). But these studies were based on small numbers and selected groups. 
As Gallagher points out, some of the early psychological work – again based 
on limited samples of specific groups including internees and children 
involved in riots – argued that people’s mental health was being deliberately 
undermined ‘as part of a campaign of psychological genocide on the part of 
the British state’ (Gallagher, 2004: 632). This seemed to produce a reaction in 
the form of studies that appeared to demonstrate just how ‘normal’ a society 
Northern Ireland was and that young people were, on the whole, coping well. 
Thereafter, ‘the stream of research and publications on the issue steadily 
dwindled… [and] a significant level of complacency developed as, for many, 
the abnormal was normalized and life continued’ (2004: 633). The conflict 
itself became increasingly contained so that specific localities bore the brunt 
of the killings and other violence. Renewed interest in the psychological 
impact of the conflict emerged with the transition to peace and the 1998 
Agreement. This was reflected both in research and in the state support given 
towards ‘victims of the Troubles’ and associated discussions of appropriate 
forms of remembrance, acknowledgement of the past and ‘truth’ commissions 
(Gilligan, 2006; Rolston, 2002).  
 
Muldoon et al cite two studies from the 1980s which used the General Health 
Questionnaire to assess levels of possible psychopathology in Northern 
Ireland (Muldoon et al, 2005). One was based on a random sample of 547 
people across Northern Ireland and the other focused on two towns (Barker et 
al, 1988; Cairns and Wilson, 1984). Both studies found that less than a 
quarter of the population was in the risk area for psychopathology as defined 
by the GHQ. This was slightly lower than the risk rates reported for Britain for 
the 1980s. These findings fit with another observation, namely that the conflict 
did not lead to an increase in referrals for mental health services (Loughrey, 
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1997). But did those services adapt to the needs of those traumatized by ‘the 
troubles’? From one in-depth account based on interviews with relatives 30 
years after Bloody Sunday, it appears that, until recently, many services were 
neither equipped nor resourced to respond to the complex needs generated 
by such events and their aftermath (Hayes and Campbell, 2005: 118-128).  
 
 
The Health and Wellbeing Surveys 
 
In 1997 and 2001, population based surveys of Health and Social Wellbeing 
were carried out in Northern Ireland. The 2001 survey included three 
questions relating to the conflict.12  First, respondents were asked ‘how much 
violence would you say there has been in this area because of the Troubles?’ 
and were given a four point scale from ‘a lot’ to ‘not very much at all’ to 
choose from. Second, (and somewhat confusingly), people were asked ‘how 
much have the Troubles affected your own life and the lives of your immediate 
family?’, answering again on a four point scale. The third question was ‘which 
of the following statements best describes the way you feel about the political 
situation in Northern Ireland at present?’ The four possible answers were 
based on the extent to which people worry about the situation. 
 
Overall mental health was rated according to the GHQ (12 questions) which 
allows a threshold to be established above which a person may have a mental 
health problem – typically a score of four or more. As Miller et al’s (2003) 
secondary analysis shows, ‘the proportion of respondents in Northern Ireland 
over the GHQ12 threshold is one third higher than in both England and 
Scotland’ – the percentages were 21.1 for NI, 15.5 for Scotland and 14.5 for 
England.  No English region matches Northern Ireland’s GHQ12 scores, 
although the North West came close for men, but not women, according to the 
Health Survey for England of 1998 (See Table 6.29, Health Survey for 
England, 1999).  Rates of psychological morbidity in the Republic of Ireland 
are half UK levels (O’Reilly and Stevenson, 2003: 491).  So Northern Ireland’s 
                                                
12 See the questionnaire at Central Survey Unit, Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, 
http://www.csu.nisra.gov.uk/surveys 
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poor mental health was significantly different from the UK and Ireland around 
the turn of the century. 
 
Gender differences, however, are very much in line with findings elsewhere. 
For both the 1997 and 2001 surveys women in Northern Ireland were 1.5 
times more likely to score highly on GHQ12 as men. This gender gap was 
widest for the 16-24yrs age group, where the ratio was 1.7:1 (Miller et al, 
2003: 80).  
 
While there was a gradient of GHQ12 high scores by socio-economic group, 
with the highest scores recorded for the partly skilled and unskilled groups, 
non-manual status ‘had no important impact on the GHQ12 score’. But the 
relatively affluent do have significantly better mental health than others, 
though this gap appeared to narrow between the two surveys.  
 
High GHQ12 scores varied significantly by age. In the 2001 survey, 21 per 
cent of the youngest age group (16-24) scored four or above, compared to 
24.8 per cent in the 45-54 age group and an overall figure of 20.9. The older 
groups showed significantly lower proportions with high GHQ12 scores. 
 
Contrary to what might be expected, social isolation – as measured by ‘living 
alone’ and an index of social contacts – was not significantly related to poor 
mental health. Nor were ‘religion’ or ‘education’ (as measured by A Level 
attainment). The most important predictors of poor mental health are stressful 
family events, lack of social support and being married (Miller et al, 2003: 29). 
However there is a clear difference in the 2001 survey between depression 
rates for those married and living with a spouse (19 per cent) and those 
married but separated (35 per cent). With an overall depression rate of 21 per 
cent, the rates for the single (never married) and widowed were 20 and 23 per 
cent respectively, while one third of divorced respondents were recorded as 
depressed (Northern Ireland Health and Wellbeing Survey 2001).  
 
In the 2001 survey, 9 per cent of respondents said that the conflict had 
affected their lives (and those of their families) ‘a lot’, and a further 17 per 
The Trouble With Suicide 
40 
 
cent, ‘quite a bit’. These were higher rates than for 1997. Those reporting 
negative effects of the conflict on their neighbourhoods also rose between 
1997 and 2001, (McWhirter, 2004: 52)  reflecting observations above about 
increases in some forms of violence post-Agreement. Of those classed as 
depressed, 15 per cent thought that the conflict had affected them a lot 
(compared to 9 per cent overall). Looked at the other way round, those who 
said they were affected by the conflict ‘a lot’ were much more likely to be 
depressed – 34 per cent compared to 21 per cent overall. Of those who said 
that the conflict had affected their neighbourhood a lot, 44 per cent were 
depressed (as defined by a high GHQ score) according to the 1997 survey. 
The figure comes down to 29 per cent in 2001. The relationship between 
conflict experience and poor mental health, and between lack of conflict 
experience and good mental health, were statistically significant to a high 
level for both survey years (Miller et al,2003: 62-72). 
 
O’Reilly and Stevenson carried out secondary analysis of the 1997 survey 
data with the specific purpose of establishing what if any relationship exists 
between Northern Ireland’s poor mental health and the conflict of past 
decades. Using regression analysis they established that ‘the greater the 
extent to which the respondent’s area or life was affected by the Troubles, the 
greater the likelihood that the respondent had poorer mental health. Neither 
demographic nor socioeconomic factors significantly diminished this relation 
although it was attenuated after adjusting for health related factors.’ (O’Reilly 
and Stevenson, 2003: 490)  Their conclusion, however, remained guarded as 
it is theoretically possible that the observed effects and relationships are in 
fact due to poverty and poor physical health. They did not attempt to explore 
the possible relationship between physical and mental ill-health. But it is 
‘probable’ that the mental health of the population has been significantly 
affected by the conflict. 
 
Such a finding has to be squared with the apparent lack of impact on demand 
for mental health services. The authors make a number of suggestions. The 
first is that doctors lack experience in recognizing PTSD. The second is that 
‘most people in Northern Ireland deal with the stress generated by the political 
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violence by denying the existence of the violence around them’ (O’Reilly and 
Stevenson, 2003: 491), a point emphasized by Hayes and Campbell (2005: 
44).  A third is that the GHQ12 scores found in the 1997 and 2001 surveys 
represent relatively mild psychological responses that people are dealing with 
in a variety of ways, including GP prescribed medications, alcohol and illicit 
drugs consumption, or through community organization, religious practice and 
family support. 
 
A study with the specific aim of assessing the impact of the conflict on mental 
health was carried out between 2003 and 2005 and covered the border 
counties of the Republic of Ireland as well as Northern Ireland (Muldoon et al, 
2005).  Based on telephone interviews with a random sample of the 
population, the researchers gathered data from a total of 3,000 respondents, 
2,000 of whom were living in Northern Ireland. The achieved sample was 
quota controlled by area to reflect adult population statistics from the latest 
Censuses, North and South, and the overall response rate was 46 per cent.  
 
The first aim of the study was to measure direct experience of the conflict. 
Nine dimensions of experience were surveyed using 28 questions covering, 
for example, violent events such as shootings and bombings, threats and 
intimidation, bereavement, forced movement, family separation, alteration of 
financial circumstances and impoverishment, injury and disability, and 
detention. They were also asked ‘were you ever a member of a paramilitary 
group’, and ‘were you ever a member of the security forces’.13 The second 
aim was to find out about trauma by asking if people had experienced any 
event that was particularly distressing, how this was affecting them 
(seventeen questions covering ‘flashbacks’, avoidance, distressing dreams, 
irritability and so on) and whether they used alcohol, prescribed medication or 
other drugs to cope with their experience of the conflict. This was followed by 
the standard questions that test for psychological morbidity in GHQ12. The 
study also looked at religious and national identity, and social and political 
attitudes. 
                                                
13 Given this survey was carried out by telephone, the reliability of the answers to such sensitive 
questions is doubtful. 
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Half of all respondents across Northern Ireland and the border counties had 
no direct or indirect experience of the conflict. Regarding direct experience, 
men (26%) were twice as likely as women to report experience of a riot, to 
have been caught up in a shooting (14%), and to have witnessed violent acts 
against others (25%). A quarter of men reported experience of intimidation 
(women, 15%). Eight per cent reported being a member of the security forces 
(four times the rate for women) and 1.8 per cent of men said they had been a 
member of a paramilitary organization (women, 0.5%). Men were seven times 
more likely to have been detained.  
 
To an extent the inclusion of the Southern border counties dilutes the 
Northern Ireland experience. Taking the North alone, a quarter of respondents 
had experienced a bombing, 24 per cent a riot and 13 per cent a shooting. 
These results show a lower experience of conflict than recorded in the 
Poverty and Social Exclusion survey (PSE), carried out in 2002/03 (Hillyard et 
al, 2003). In the PSE survey 34 per cent had witnessed a bombing, 38 per 
cent rioting and 26 per cent a shooting. But some results were higher. In the 
Legacy study 23 per cent of the Northern Ireland respondents had witnessed 
a violent act against others; in the PSE survey, though not strictly comparable, 
21 per cent had seen someone being assaulted (Hillyard et al, 2005: 135). 
 
This experience of violence resulted in ten per cent of all respondents 
reporting symptoms severe enough to be classed as PTSD. For the Northern 
sample, the figure was 12 per cent. People in the PTSD category were six 
times more likely than average to be using alcohol to cope with their 
experience of violence, ten times more likely to be taking prescribed 
medication and six times more likely to be taking other drugs. Scores for 
PTSD and GHQ12 indicated that poorer mental health was associated with 
greater experience of violence. For PTSD the relationship was particularly 
strong, with direct experience of the conflict accounting for a quarter of the 
variation in PTSD scores.  
 
Hayes and Campbell (2005) use the distinction between Type I and Type 2 
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trauma. The latter is complex, chronic and enduring. The original trauma of 
the loss of a relative on Bloody Sunday was further compounded by ‘the 
treatment of family members by the military and police, the flawed Widgery 
investigation, and the persistent civil unrest and violence’ (2005: 43). Thirty 
five years after the event, the Saville Inquiry is still deliberating on the events 
of that day. Many of the family members, they argue, display the features of a 
complex Type 2 PTSD reaction. While Bloody Sunday was a unique turning 
point in the conflict, Hayes and Campbell state that many others had similar 
experiences to those of the Bloody Sunday families (Reilly, 2002). 
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Section 4 
 
Mental Health and Suicide 
 
 
In much of the literature on suicide there is an implied, and sometimes 
explicit, causal chain between the risk factors for depression, mental disorders 
and both attempted and actual suicide. For example, the World Bank’s 
website states: 
Suicide is the worst case scenario for many mental health disorders. 
Lack of diagnosis and proper treatment as well as a range of social, 
political and economic risk factors compounds the risk of a mental 
disorder leading to suicide. People suffering from mental disorders are 
more likely to be poor, to be substance abusers, live on the street and 
be socially excluded.14  
Suicide rates are often taken as indicators of the state of mental health within 
a country or locality, as well as being seen as a product of poor mental health. 
The relationship between suicide and mental ill-health is far from 
straightforward, however. 
 
A review of studies of suicide and schizophrenia, itself a contested diagnosis, 
established that ten per cent of patients kill themselves and that their risk of 
suicide is 40 times that of the general population (De Hert and Peuskens, 
2002). Similarly, a review of psychological autopsy studies carried out over 
the past 40 years found that about half of the suicide victims suffered from 
depressive disorder, and half had a major depressive episode (Lönnqvist, 
2002: 111). It is also observed that over half of clinically depressed persons 
have suicidal thoughts which are more likely if the depression is severe (2002: 
108). One study from Northern Ireland is cited in which a psychological 
autopsy was carried out on all suicides for a twelve month period in 1992/3. A 
strong gender effect was observed with ‘major unipolar depression’ as the 
principal diagnosis for 52 per cent of the women but only 26 per cent of the 
men. Age was also significant with depression as the principal factor in three-
quarters of the suicides of those over 65yrs and 27 per cent for those under 
                                                
14 See under ‘mental health’ at http://web.worldbank.org/ 
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65. The findings are based on low numbers (especially of women), however 
(reported in Foster et al, 1997).   While psychological morbidity is clearly 
associated with suicide to a degree, the association varies considerably from 
place to place and by significant social variables such as gender.  
 
Depression, anxiety, and other mental disorders do not, however, provide 
anything like a complete picture of attempted and actual suicide. 
Psychological factors themselves may be shaped by either biology (including 
genetic susceptibility) (Träskman-Bendz, 2002)  or social processes and 
structures, or both. When suicide trends change over time and where suicide 
patterns differ significantly from place to place, biological explanations are of 
limited use.  
 
 
Suicide statistics 
 
Most discussions of suicide rates refer to the issue of the reliability of official 
data. The classic sociological text, Durkheim’s Suicide – first published in 
1897 (but not available in an English translation until 1951) – remains at the 
heart of core debates within sociology, not because of what it says about 
suicide as such but because of its treatment of official statistics as ‘social 
facts’ and debates around ‘scientific’ approaches to understanding social 
phenomena. As Atkinson points out, the attention paid to Durkheim’s book 
does not reflect an intrinsic concern with the phenomenon of suicide as such 
but with the issues raised by his approach to the topic: 
Paradoxically, the extensiveness of that interest is of little help to the 
would-be researcher into suicide. For from whatever stance one 
approaches the research, one is faced with fundamental and unsolved 
methodological problems which appear so obvious…[W]hether one’s 
interest is in the relationship between sociological and psychological 
modes of explanation… important decisions have to be made about the 
status and adequacy of the data chosen for analysis. (Atkinson, 1978: 
31-2)  
Almost 50 years ago, the World Health Organisation began to investigate 
ways of improving the reliability and comparability of national suicide data, for 
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the simple reason that ‘many have suggested that suicide is generally under-
reported and that the international suicide rates are so inaccurate that no 
useful conclusions can be drawn from them’ (Brooke, 1974: 15). At the time 
this study was carried out, the Republic of Ireland had the lowest recorded 
suicide rate of all the countries examined – 1.8 per 100,000 (for 1970). 
Scotland’s rate was 7.6 which exceeded Northern Ireland’s rate for men alone 
(7.3 in 1969). In contrast, the recorded rate for Czechoslovakia (1968) was 
24.5, and for Sri Lanka, 17.2.  
 
One issue in the accuracy debate concerns the classification of deaths. Since 
1893 there has been an international system for classifying deaths and 
diseases, known as the International Classification of Diseases, now in its 
tenth revision (ICD 10).15  Chapter XX covers external causes of morbidity 
and mortality, including intentional self-harm for which there are 25 different 
codes covering everything from poisoning from antidepressants (X61) through 
to intentional self-harm by jumping or lying before a moving object (X81). 
Clearly, the key judgement required by legal and medical authorities with the 
responsibility to determine and record cause of death is whether there is 
sufficient evidence of ‘intent’. When that is deemed to be lacking, the death is 
likely to be recorded under ‘undetermined intent’ or even as an accidental 
death, and classified under one of 25 similar causes, including ‘contact with 
explosive material’ (Y25) and ‘crashing of motor vehicle’ (Y32). Hence, some 
research has focused on the role of coroners and registrars, looking into 
decision-making around imputing intent (see in the Belfast context Prior, 
1989; also Atkinson,1978). 
 
In terms of the social processes involved in a death (or injury) becoming a 
suicide (or attempted suicide) statistic, sociologists have made much of 
‘concealment’ – the capacity of families and others to hide evidence around 
cause of death (or injury). There may be social and material reasons for 
covering up suicide and these change over time and between social groups. 
                                                
15 The ICD started life as the Bertillon Classification of Causes of Death, named after the Chief of 
Statistical Services of the City of Paris, Jacques Bertillon. See History of the development of the ICD, at 
http://www.who.int/classifications/icd/en/ 
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The role of religion in society – one of Durkheim’s main explanations for 
differences in suicide rates between ‘Catholic’ and ‘Protestant’ countries – 
may be important, depending of levels of religiosity in a community or family, 
and the extent to which suicide is frowned upon by religious leaders.  
 
Suicide has been both sin and crime. Traditionally, suicides were denied a 
sacred burial and had to forfeit all property, though the pace and extent of the 
‘secularization’ and medicalisation of suicide is a matter of considerable 
debate among historians (Healy, 2006). Prussia decriminalized as early as 
1751 followed by revolutionary France in 1790. While ‘laws on suicide are not 
a good index of actual practice’, it is nevertheless interesting that 
decriminalization was much more protracted in Britain and Ireland. Bodily 
desecration came to an end in Britain in 1823, the confiscation of property in 
1870 and the removal of remaining penalties in 1961. In the Irish Republic 
there was a prosecution for attempted suicide as late as 1967 and suicide 
remained a crime until 1993. In terms of social practices, what counts is the 
force of attitudes towards suicide, not the letter of the law. According to one 
authority, the Victorian middle classes in England went to great lengths to 
hide an act of suicide as not only was it illegal and immoral, but the only way 
of holding on to property in a known case of suicide was to plead insanity 
(Gates, 1988).  Even if this had its own stigmatizing drawbacks, at least a 
Christian burial was possible for an ‘insane’ suicide. While the medicalization 
of suicide may not have suited the respectable classes it certainly suited the 
growing numbers of medical superintendents of asylums who were able to 
show that in-house suicide rates were kept low, without the use of restraints, 
compared to those outside of the asylum (MacDonald and Murphy, 1990;  see 
also Anderson, 1987; Shepherd and Wright, 2002).   
 
As indicated above, decriminalization came very late in Ireland and the Dáil 
debates at the time give a flavour of the prevailing attitudes. It is only in very 
recent years that Catholic Bishops have formally encouraged a sympathetic 
attitude towards suicide (Irish Bishops’ Conference, 2004). So the incentive to 
conceal has been strong:  
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Bereavement for accidental or natural death rarely necessitates 
counselling because there is an obvious reason for the loss, however 
tragic, of a loved one. Loss of a loved one by suicide is different. The 
family are inevitably subjected to investigation by police, coroners and 
insurance agents. Because there is still a stigma attached to suicide, 
there is often less support for the survivors in a situation where more 
support is needed. The first and most notable reaction of the bereaved 
is that of guilt. There is a tendency to blame oneself. This is 
compounded by denial, shame, an avoidance of communication and a 
withdrawal from normal social relationships. Concealment of the fact 
seems more preferable than the awkwardness that the discussion of 
the suicide may bring. (Seanad Éireann, Volume 130, 4 December 
1991, col. 1356.)  
The power and desire to conceal a suicide has been linked to the degree of 
social integration. Forty years ago in his critique of Durkheim, Douglas argued 
that biases in official statistics reflect class, occupation and other aspects of 
social structure. In situations where suicide is stigmatized,  
there will be both differential tendencies on the parts of members of 
different (official) categories to have any “suspicious” deaths within 
their families categorized as something other than “suicide” and 
differential degrees of success in these attempts. Moreover, it seems 
reasonable to expect that the attempts and the frequencies of success 
will be greatest precisely in those groups which are most “integrated” in 
the society… [T]he greater the degree of social “integration” of a group, 
the lower will be its official suicide rate as a result of the nature of the 
official categorization process itself. (Douglas, 1971: 129)  
 
There remains a material element that provides an added incentive to 
concealment. It is still common to find suicide clauses in insurance contracts 
that invalidate claims on policies. Such clauses vary from outright exclusion to 
time-limited exclusion, typically one or two years in the case of life 
insurance.16  There is some evidence that such time limits influence suicide 
rates, or, possibly, disclosure of suicide. Tseng examined mortality data from 
the Society of Actuaries in the US covering a five year period in the early 
1990s. These were records of those holding life insurance policies and who 
took their own lives – over 7,000 individuals or just under two per cent of all 
                                                
16 For example, the company that specialises in services for the over-50s – Saga – offers a personal 
accident policy covering death benefits that states: ‘We will not pay any claim arising directly or indirectly 
from the following. Suicide or intentional self-inflicted injury’, in addition to all the other typical exclusions 
– war, terrorism, service in the armed forces, ‘civil war, rebellion, revolution, insurrection, civil 
commotion assuming the proportions of or amounting to an uprising, military or usurped power’. 
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insured deaths during the period in question (Tseng, 2004).17   
 
It was found that the suicide rate of the insured was only about a third of the 
overall rate in the population, probably because the insured earn more and 
because of insurance screening which results in the insured having better 
mental health than the population at large. Another finding was that insured 
males aged 15-24 had 2.3 times the suicide rate of insured males aged 25-34. 
In the population as a whole, however, the suicide rate for 15-24 yr olds was 
89 per cent of the 25-34 yr old group.  In terms of economic incentives, it is 
suggested that, ‘people who purchase life insurance for their own lives are 
more cautious about the consequences of their deaths and therefore are less 
likely to commit suicide. Most young adults purchase life insurance for their 
own lives, while policies written on the life of youths are usually purchased by 
their parents or grandparents.’ (Tseng, 2004: 6-7)  The central finding, 
consistent across age and gender, was that the suicide rate of the insured 
quadruples after the two year exclusion period. Further, it is argued that many 
of the deaths recorded as ‘accidental’ during the first two years of the 
insurance policy (the period covered by the suicide exclusion clause) are in 
fact disguised suicides. In the absence of data showing the age and gender 
profile of all life insurance policy holders, it is not possible to estimate just how 
these findings might affect national suicide recording but given the relatively 
small numbers involved, the affect is unlikely to be significant. 
 
Practices in relation to the recording of death continue to evolve. The Luce 
Report investigated death certification in Britain and Northern Ireland in 2003 
and listed thirteen ‘critical weaknesses’ in a system that is fragmented, lacks 
consistency and is insensitive to the needs of the bereaved. (Luce Report, 
2003)  Prior to the Luce Report suspected suicides in Northern Ireland were 
referred to a coroner who held an inquest. Post-Luce, the practice is to hold 
an inquest only when the family requests this. The coroner’s findings are 
passed to the General Register Office which will consult with the coroner if 
there are doubts about the appropriate ICD coding. This process involves 
delays between the occurrence of death and its actual registration – a delay of 
                                                
17 The data are biased towards larger companies that tend to have lower mortality rates.  
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two years or more in 3 per cent of cases. A quarter of suicides are registered 
within six months of the death and 70 per cent within a year (Information 
Analysis Directorate, n.d.). This means that a substantial number of suicides 
are not recorded for the year in which they actually took place and the effect 
of this is that the official figures mask changes in suicide trends as illustrated 
in Figure 1: occurrences were 19 per cent above registrations in 1998.18 The 
lag is just as evident when the same data are presented as three year rolling 
averages (Figure 2) and the discrepancy between registration and occurrence 
is inconsistent from year to year. ‘Events of undetermined intent’ are not 
included in these figures.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of suicide registration and occurrence 
 
Source: Registrar General Northern Ireland, Annual Report 2005, Belfast: Northern Ireland 
Statistics and Research Agency, 2006, p. 19; Mortality Statistics for 2006, NISRA 22 March 
2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
18 Only 72 of the 291 suicides registered in 2006 occurred in that year. 
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Figure 2: Comparison of suicide registration and occurrence (three year 
rolling averages) 
 
Source: Compiled from data in Registrar General Northern Ireland, Annual Report 2005, 
Belfast: Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, 2006, p. 19. 
 
 
A study in the Irish Republic looking at the registration/occurrence 
discrepancy between 1987 and 2003, found that the numbers of occurrences 
were always above registrations apart from the years 1987 and 1993. The last 
date was the year of decriminalisation although in the following year 
occurrences were about 12 per cent above registrations and were well above 
the 1992 figures (Corcoran et al, 2006: 131). In addition, the discrepancy has 
increased over the period and climbed as high as 18 per cent in 2000. Where 
there is a delay in registration it is possible that a suicide is omitted from the 
registration record altogether, as the authors explain: 
 
While the CSO [Central Statistics Office] may have been notified that a 
death has taken place, it will not be recorded in their registration figures 
until sufficient data have been gathered to fully classify the cause of 
death. If this does not happen before the deadline for the annual 
registered deaths report, then such pending cases will not be included 
in the report nor will they be included in the subsequent year’s annual 
registered deaths report. However, all such deaths will be included in 
the annual report based on year of occurrence. (Corcoran et al, 2006: 
133) 
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The Luce Report points out that, compared to most other jurisdictions, many 
more deaths in the UK are referred to coroners and the autopsy rate is two to 
three times that found elsewhere. Regarding suicide and in conformity with 
international standards, Luce recommends that an inquest should not be 
automatic, but would be necessary only in those cases in which there was 
some third party involvement, or the death had taken place in prison or under 
mental health legislation. Deaths from suicide should not automatically qualify 
for a public inquest. The Report also recommends dropping the verdict of 
‘suicide’, which still retains criminal connotations, and using the expression: 
“death from a deliberate act of self-harm or injury”. (2003: 6)   
 
A draft Coroner’s Bill was published in June 2006 which rejects key 
recommendations of the Luce Report and does not tackle death certification. 
The Constitutional Affairs Select Committee (2006) is critical of the Bill for 
failing to address reform of the death certification process as proposed not 
only by the Luce Report, but also by the Shipman Inquiry (2003). Instead of a 
national Coroner’s service, the Bill recommends a new office of Chief Coroner 
supported by an advisory council to improve liaison with registrars and 
medical practitioners. In its response to the Constitutional Affairs Committee 
report, the Government makes clear that it does not intend to reform the death 
certification process at present.19   
 
All of these points mean that suicide statistics need to be treated with 
considerable caution and should not be used uncritically. Studies that are 
simply based on exploring statistical relationships between recorded suicides 
and any available variables rarely question the data. While the numbers of 
suicides and the rate of suicide are very often taken as plain facts in public as 
well as academic discussion, the data need to be treated with caution in the 
light of knowledge about what produces a suicide statistic and where this 
leads in terms of understanding the social context of suicide and the 
development of policy responses to it. Both international comparisons and 
changes in trends may have as much to do with differences in the way suicide 
                                                
19 See Reform of the Coroners' System and Death Certification Government Response to the 
Constitutional Affairs Select Committee’s Report, November 2006, Command Paper Cm 6943. 
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comes to be defined and registered, as with ‘real’ differences and changes in 
suicide per se.  
 
 
Self-harm  
 
Before exploring suicide statistics further, it is important to mention self-
harming. It is only quite recently that attempts have been made to estimate 
the prevalence of self-harming, with the focus on younger people. One 
approach is to monitor relevant hospital attendances, about 8 per cent of 
which result in death that is registered as a suicide. But the difficulty with this 
is that most self-harming does not end up in a hospital casualty department or 
as a hospital admission. As Brophy (2006: 20) observes, many young people 
who self-harm do not come to the attention of services or professionals and 
statistics are further confused by survey evidence adopting different 
definitions. 
  
According to a large-scale survey of 15 and 16 year olds in Birmingham, 
Northampton and Oxfordshire, 11 per cent of girls and 3 per cent of boys 
reported self-harming in the previous twelve months. Only 12.6 per cent of 
these reported incidents resulted in a visit to hospital (Samaritans 2002). In 
this survey, self-cutting was involved in almost two-thirds (64%) of the 
incidents of self-harming, but there is very little research on the subject. A 
study of hospital treated self-cutting carried out in Scotland indicates that ‘the 
annual incidence of hospital treated self-cutting is about 31 per 100,000 
population aged 15 to 19 years, with a somewhat higher rate among females 
than males’ (Brophy, 2006: 21). 
 
Hospital admissions as a consequence of self-harm in Northern Ireland are 
analysed in the DHSSPS Draft Suicide Prevention Strategy (2006: paras. 
2.14-2.17). Two-thirds of the self-harming that requires hospital admission is 
accounted for by 25-54 years olds and a further quarter in the 16-24 age 
group. For most age groups more women than men are admitted as a result 
of self-harming with the widest difference in the youngest age groups. Those 
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admitted to hospital who die will be registered as suicides but such deaths 
account for only 8 per cent of all suicides (Information Analysis Directorate, 
n.d.). Clearly, much more work could be done to monitor parasuicide, 
following the example of the National Parasuicide Registry developed by the 
National Suicide Research Foundation based in Cork. 
 
The traditional view of self-harming is that it is a step towards suicide, if not a 
suicide attempt itself. But Fox and Hawton (cited in Brophy, 2006) estimate 
that there are between 40 and 100 times more young people who self-harm 
than suicides. As Brophy puts it, ‘Self-harm is usually intended to harm: not to 
kill, or even to inflict serious and/or permanent damage. It is a strategy which 
(however maladaptive and damaging) makes it possible for the young person 
to continue with life, not to end it. Some people who self-harm do also try to 
kill themselves at some point but these are a very small minority’ (2006: 28) 
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Section 5 
 
Suicide: Patterns and Trends 
 
 
The World Health Organisation maintains a global suicide data set where the 
variable quality and availability of national suicide statistics is evident. There is 
very little information available for Africa: Zimbabwe, one of four countries 
represented in the dataset, has figures for 1990 only. For most of the 
Americas, the data are ten years out of date, possibly reflecting the lack of 
priority given to suicide in countries that appear to have low rates.20  For 
example Argentina’s rate fell from 9.9 to 6.4 per 100,000 persons between 
1970 and 1996. Chile’s rate was 4.2 in 1950, 7.5 in 1960 and has been more 
or less flat since the 1970s, with the latest recorded rate of 5.7 for 1994. 
Likewise, Venezuela and Brazil have stable rates of between 4 and 5. 
Mexico’s rate is even lower at less than 2 for the period since 1960, although 
beginning to show an increase in the 1990s: a rate of 3.1 by 1995. The latest 
available figure for Guatemala is for 1984 with a recorded rate of 0.5 – the 
same as Peru. The Latin American exception is Cuba which has had a long 
history of high suicide rates, dipping down in the years following the revolution 
but from 1970 rising to 21.3 in 1992. The fall in the rate to 18.3 by 1996 
suggests that public health initiatives launched in 1989 have made an 
impact.21  Cuban men aged 65-74 have a rate of 62.6 and the 75+ age group, 
113.2. These high rates have been explained in terms of the social 
acceptability of suicide down the centuries, notwithstanding the Castro 
doctrine that life belongs to the revolution rather than the individual. 
 
The other exceptions in the Americas are Canada and the US. Canadian 
rates rose from the 1950s, doubling between 1955 and 1980. By 2002 the 
rate stood at 11.6. Canada stands out for another reason – its age profile for 
suicide declines for people over 45. The reverse is true for most other 
                                                
20 All the rates that follow are based on suicides per 100,000 of the population and are taken from the 
World Health Organisation website at 
http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide/country_reports/en/index.html 
21 In 1989, the National Programme for the Prevention and Control of Suicidal Conduct was introduced. 
See Pérez (2005). 
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countries. The US rate was 7.6 in 1950 climbing steadily to 12.4 by 1990 and 
falling back to 11.0 by 2002. Unlike Canada, US rates climb with age after 65, 
but modestly as compared with most countries. 
 
The wealthy countries in the pacific region have had relatively high suicide 
rates in recent decades. Japan in particular has rates twice those of the US 
and Canada. In 1955 Japan’s suicide rate was 25.1. It was 25.5 in 2003 but 
varied in the interim reaching a low of 14.7 at one stage in the 1960s. In terms 
of age, the highest rates are for those in their mid-40s to their mid-60s, a 
bulge which reflects what is happening to men rather than women. Australia 
and New Zealand have quite flat profiles over time with Australia reaching a 
high point of 14.9 in the 1960s while New Zealand’s peak came in the mid-
1990s. Both countries have similar rates now: Australia, 11.8 for 2002 and 
New Zealand, 11.5 for 2003 (New Zealand Ministry of Health, 2006).   
 
Before coming on to Europe, it is worth mentioning some other highs and 
lows. Iran, Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait and Syria have suicide rates that are 
negligible. Religion is thought to be a protective factor in Muslim countries as 
the Islamic religion ‘poses strong sanctions against suicide as it is viewed as a 
form of homicide, forbids alcohol consumption, and teaches a problem-solving 
method for times of acute stress by the recitation of sayings from the Koran, 
thus reducing compulsive acts of suicide.’ (Cheng and Lee, 2002: 39)   This 
point was noted by Durkheim over a century ago when he wrote that ‘nothing, 
in fact, is more contrary to the general spirit of Mahometan civilization than 
suicide’ (Durkheim, 2002: 294). Or as Dabbagh puts it in her study of suicide 
in Palestine, ‘it is popularly thought in the Arab world that suicide is a 
“Western thing”’ (2005: 231) and indeed she found low rates of suicide even 
after unrecorded and undocumented cases were taken into account. The 
Islamic tradition defines suicide as a ‘grave sin’ while martyrdom is ‘rewarded’. 
Dabbagh discusses how the ‘cultural categories of suicide and martyrdom are 
not static’ (2005: 232) so that in exceptionally desperate times, socially, 
economically and politically, ‘martydom’ expands to cover a broader range of 
deaths and intentions, even though religious conservatism still acts to keep 
‘suicide’ at low levels. 
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However, religion does not appear to act as a protective factor for people in 
Sri Lanka where a rate of 35.8 was recorded for 1985 falling to 21.6 by 1996, 
though it is unclear how the civil war has affected the recording of suicide. 
About three-quarters of the Sri Lankan population are Sinhala, most of whom 
are Buddhist. This section of the population is slightly overrepresented in the 
suicide statistics compared to Tamils and those with the Muslim faith. Other 
largely Buddhist countries do not have high suicide rates (Cheng and Lee, 
2002: 40).  
 
China also stands out for having high rates of suicide, notably in rural areas. 
Unusually, rates for women either match or exceed those for men. For 1999 
the ‘selected urban areas’ suicide rate was 6.7 overall and 6.6 for women. At 
the beginning of the decade it was 8.6 overall and 9.1 for women. For 
‘selected rural areas’, the rates were as high as 32.3 for women, 23.2 for men 
and 27.6 overall in 1987.  A rate of 24.7 was recorded for women in 1999. The 
male rate was 20.4 that year but for the over 75s it was 139.7.  
 
As more in-depth research is carried out in developing countries there will be 
more challenges to what are understood as prevailing trends and patterns. 
Work carried out in the Tamil Nadu region of Southern India, for example, 
discovered very high rates of suicide among young women in the 15-19 age 
bracket (Aaron et al, 2004). Although dealing with relatively low numbers, the 
pattern over ten years was such that the average suicide rate for this group 
was 152. For young men it was 69. The rate for the women was 70 times the 
rate for the equivalent group in the UK. The researchers suggest that rates of 
suicide reported in other parts of India are low ‘because identification of 
suicides is difficult owing to inefficient civil registration systems, non-reporting 
of deaths, variable standards in certifying death, and the legal and social 
consequences of suicide. We do not believe that our findings are a local 
aberration.’ (Aaron et al, 2004: 1118)  
 
The picture in Europe is also one of marked contrasts. The highest suicide 
rates are found in the countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc. 
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In the mid-1990s Lithuania’s rate reached 45.6 falling to 40.2 in 2004. 
Lithuania’s suicide age profile is untypical, rising to the 45-54 group and 
declining thereafter, though this result is to do with the dominance of men in 
the figures. Lithuanian men have a suicide rate of 70.1 which is five times the 
rate for women. Men aged 45-54 have a suicide rate of 129.3. Hungary shows 
a similar pattern though the gender differential is less at 3.7 times. The age 
profile is also more in keeping with other countries. Hungary’s suicide rate 
rose steadily from 1955 (20.6), peaked at 44.9 in 1980 and fell to 27.7 by 
2003. Ukraine’s rate is much the same now as it was in the early 1980s, 
though there was a rise in the rate during the 1990s, to a peak of 29.6.  The 
gender difference is even more marked than in Lithuania at six times. The 
Russian Federation follows the Ukraine pattern quite closely only at a higher 
level with a rate of 34.3 in 2004. The gender differential in rates is also six 
times.  Belarus is much the same and has a rate of 35.1 though suicide trends 
have been getting steadily worse since 1990.  
 
Like Lithuania, the other Baltic states have suicide rates that peaked in the 
mid-1990s but not at quite such a high level. Latvia’s rate is now 24.3 (2004) 
compared to Estonia’s rate of 27.3 (2002). The gender differential in both 
countries is over five times (male to female) and they have similar age profiles 
for suicide rates. Estonia, however, has higher rates among the lower age 
groups. For men aged 25-34 the Latvian rate is 37.1 but it is 57.1 for the 
equivalent group in Estonia. Not all former Eastern-bloc countries have high 
suicide rates, however. Romania has a rate of 12.5 (2004), Moldova 16.7 and 
the Czech Republic 15.5. Poland stands out for having a steady upward trend 
line from 1955 onwards. The rate for women has been quite stable since 1970 
(a very slight rise over time) but the rate for men has risen from 9.6 (1955) to 
26.7 (2003) increasing the differential from three to six times. The age profile 
is such that the highest rate of suicide is for the 45-54 group.  Croatia’s rate 
has declined gradually since the mid-1980s and stood at 19.6 by 2004. The 
male suicide rate is three times the female rate. 
 
A recent report on the state of mental health in the European Union discussed 
differences in suicide rates across what were then the 15 countries of the EU 
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plus Norway (European Commission, 2004).  For 1997, the report shows that 
rates vary from 3 in Greece to 24 in Finland. The UK was third lowest with a 
rate of 7 and Ireland was 8th highest at 13. The report recognizes the problem 
of differences in death certification so looks at suicide combined with deaths 
from events of ‘undetermined intent’ many of which will be suicides. This 
dramatically alters the position for Portugal, pushing it into the top half rather 
than second from the bottom. The impact is less great for other countries 
though substantial for the UK. 
 
Trends over time are examined for the period 1980 to 1999. There was a 
strong decrease in suicide rates for women across all countries except Spain 
and Luxembourg. The trend was especially strong for Denmark, and strong 
for Sweden, Austria and the UK. For men, rates increased strongly in Ireland 
and less so in Spain and Luxembourg, and marginally in Norway and Greece. 
The overall rate for the UK declined very slightly, but for some other countries 
the trend was strong: Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Finland and Portugal. The 
report comments: ‘it could be argued that the Irish suicide rate has not really 
increased, but that there has been a cultural change towards suicide. If such a 
hypothesis were true, this should correspond also to a drop in deaths from 
events of undetermined intent. This is not the case, however, in Ireland where 
deaths from events of undetermined intent among men increased by 14 per 
cent between 1995 and 2000.’ (European Commission, 2004: 26)  
 
The age profile for death rates for suicide varies widely across EU countries. 
In Ireland the rate for men 0-64 years exceeds that for men over 65 by a 
considerable margin but it is the only country where this is the case. The 
widest difference in rates between these two age groups is for Austria; the 
least difference is in the UK (based on 1997 figures). Luxembourg is the only 
country where female rates of suicide in the younger of the two age bands 
exceed that for the older band. The greatest difference is again in Austria. 
When gender is looked at in the 15-24 years age group, males have four 
times the rate of females in Ireland and Finland. 
 
The report finds no relationship between suicide, risk of poverty and 
The Trouble With Suicide 
62 
 
unemployment, and comments that Ireland, the country with the best 
economic trend in the period 1980-2000, has had the highest increase in 
suicides. On the other hand, there was an increase in alcohol consumption 
levels during this time and an increase in the rate of drug-related deaths (as in 
Greece). Over a twenty year period to 2001, pure alcohol consumption is 
estimated to have gone up by over fifty per cent in Ireland whereas in most 
countries (except Luxembourg and Finland) there was a substantial decline 
(e.g. Italy, Spain, and France). The UK experienced a minor drop in 
consumption. The report cites an estimate that half of all deaths from 
intentional and unintentional injury across the EU are related to alcohol 
consumption.  
 
Lester et al (1997) compared suicide trends in Northern Ireland, England and 
Wales, Scotland and Ireland over a thirty year period from 1960. They used 
data gathered by the World Health Organisation which do not appear to 
include ‘events of undetermined intent’ as suicides. The trends are 
summarized in Figure 3 below. The authors looked at gender and age, and 
explored possible statistical relationships with unemployment, marriage and 
birth rates.  
 
In Ireland, suicide rates rose for men and women, unlike in Scotland and 
England and Wales where rates rose for men only (marginally so in the case 
of England and Wales). In every country the male-to-female ratio of suicide 
rates went up: in other words gender differences became more marked. 
Because suicide rates rose (by more than 2.5 times) for men and women in 
Ireland, Lester et al suggest, following Kelleher and Daly (1990), that the 
overall increase ‘may be a result of a tendency for coroners to certify suicidal 
death more accurately in Ireland during this period’ (1997: 304). This is 
supported by Walsh et al (1990) who argue that about one third of the 
increase in suicide in the Republic between 1968 and 1987 was due to 
improved Central Statistics Office coding of coroners’ findings.  
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Figure 3:  Suicide rates 1960-1990 
Source: Compiled from data in Lester et al (1997) 
 
Lester et al  came up with somewhat contradictory results for marriage and 
unemployment. Rates of marriage were positively associated with suicide 
rates for men and women in Ireland but negatively so for the other 
jurisdictions. The unemployment rates of women in Northern Ireland and 
Ireland were negatively associated with suicide whereas they were positively 
associated in the case of Scotland and England and Wales. For men in every 
country, unemployment was positively associated with suicide. The analysis 
ends on a speculative note that perhaps ‘differences in the provision of mental 
health services between the regions could be responsible for some of the 
regional differences identified’ (1997: 304). The conflict in Northern Ireland is 
not mentioned at all, which is rather surprising given Lester’s earlier work 
correlating suicide rates and conflict-related deaths (2002).  
 
The age-related data presented by Lester et al show how Northern Ireland’s 
profile has changed relative to the other countries since 1960.  Prior to the 
onset of the conflict, Northern Ireland’s suicide rates across the age bands 
matched the profile of the Republic of Ireland albeit at a higher level (Figure 
4). Scotland and England and Wales were similar except for the over 65s.  
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Figure 4: Suicide age profiles by country 
 
 
 
Source: Lester et al (1997) and Forty-sixth Annual Report of the Registrar General 1967 
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The chart for 1970 includes an immediate pre-conflict profile for Northern 
Ireland for the year 1967. Again this matches the shape of the Republic of 
Ireland profile for 1970 but at double the rates for most ages. The Northern 
Ireland suicide rate fell to 3.9 in 1970 and in terms of age was much closer to 
the Republic’s profile with the exception of 35-54 year olds. Comparing 1967 
and 1970 there is a distinct shift in the profile towards the younger age groups 
(especially the 35-44 age group). By 1980, rates in the Republic have more 
than tripled for the 35-54 groups and the shape of the profile is most similar to 
Northern Ireland with the clear exception of the 45-54 group.  For the last date 
in the series (1990) the peak rate for both the Republic and Northern Ireland 
is for the 55-64 age group. In generational terms this is the same cohort that 
peaks twenty years earlier in 1970 for Northern Ireland as the 35-44 age 
group. In 1980 however, this cohort (45-54) has a low suicide rate. 
 
The question remains, how reliable are the trends observed above? One of 
the factors that receives little attention in Lester et al’s analysis is variations in 
the method of suicide over time and the impact on the recording of suicide. As 
Neeleman and Wessely (1997) show, the likelihood of a premature death 
being registered as a suicide varies widely by circumstance. They looked at 
coroners’ verdicts in England and Wales, comparing the ratio of ‘open’ 
(undetermined) to ‘suicide’ findings for different methods. They found that:  
[C]ompared with deaths by hanging, the open-suicide ratio was higher 
in cases of drug overdose, jumping from heights, other violent methods 
and especially drowning. This pattern applied to male and female 
deaths but the open-suicide ratio for female deaths through other 
violent means was substantially higher than it was for male deaths. 
Male deaths involving gas-poisoning were less likely than male 
hanging deaths to receive an open verdict while the reverse applied to 
female deaths. (Neeleman and Wessely, 1997: 469) 
The open-suicide ratio was higher for younger people, women and for 
incidents such as drowning and falling/jumping from heights. In England and 
Wales, while overall suicide rates were declining the proportion of suicides 
accounted for by hanging and gas poisoning doubled for both men and 
women. Controlling for age, gender and method, however, Neeleman and 
Wessely still found that open verdicts became more likely in England and 
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Wales for the period examined, a trend that was unique for the eight countries 
used for comparison. They suggest that the explanation lies in the judgements 
made by doctors and coroners. Some of this debate has been resolved by the 
inclusion of ‘events of undetermined intent’ in published suicide statistics in 
more recent years, but it is still the case that trends over time and between 
countries are uncertain.  
 
Figure 5 shows the number of recorded suicides and ‘events of undetermined 
intent’ for Northern Ireland since 1967. There was a sharp decline in the 
suicides registered in the early years of the conflict: the numbers halved in 
four years. There was a similarly dramatic change between 1979 and 1987 
when the numbers more than doubled, from 70 to 145. For much of the 1990s 
the annual number of recorded suicides stabilized at just above 120. Since 
1999 the trend has been somewhat erratic but with three of the highest 
numbers ever recorded occurring in the last six years.  
 
 
Figure 5: Number of recorded suicides and deaths of undetermined 
intent 1967-2005 
 Source: Registrar General Northern Ireland, Annual Reports. 
 
 
The practice of putting deaths from intentional self-harm/injury with deaths of 
undetermined intent was followed in the latest National Statistics Office 
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analysis of suicide in the UK (Brock et al, 2006).  Overall, suicide rates have 
been falling for the UK and, indeed, reached a 30-year low in 2003 (National 
Statistics Press Release, 10 March 2005).  But the story varies considerably 
for different parts of the UK, as illustrated above. At the beginning of the 
1980s, Northern Ireland had the lowest suicide rate (5.3) of all the countries in 
the UK (Scotland 10.0), and a lower rate than the Republic of Ireland (6.3) 
(Lester et al, 1997).  The only exception was for women aged 15-44 where 
the Northern Ireland rate was above that for Wales and England (Bunting and 
Kelly, 1998: 9).   
 
Bunting and Kelly (1998) compared suicide trends across the UK between 
1982 and 1996 using age-standardised death rates, for men and women 
separately and for the two age-groups 15–44 and 45 and over. For these four 
categories suicide rates went down in all countries in the UK, except for the 
category, men aged 15-44. The English trend for this category rose steadily to 
the early 1990s but declined thereafter, unlike in the other countries where the 
rates continued to climb (albeit unevenly). Northern Ireland overtook the 
English rate by 1996. Suicide rates for 15-44 year old men increased by 50 
per cent in Northern Ireland.  
 
As Brock et al (2006) show, Scotland has by far the highest suicide rates for 
men and women, reaching 32.8 for men in 1998/2000 (three year rolling 
average) falling back to 30.0 for 2002/04. Northern Ireland’s rate for men was 
the lowest (18.1) compared to all the UK countries and all the English regions 
at the start of the 1990s. But it overtook the English rate around 1998 and is 
now exactly in line with the UK average for 2002/04 (18.3). The rate increased 
from 1996/98 and began to fall again in 2001/03. The same trend can be seen 
for Wales and to a lesser extent Scotland.  
 
Taking the two periods 1991-1997 and 1998-2004, Brock et al’s  analysis 
shows the suicide rate for women aged 15-44 in Northern Ireland increased 
by about 20 per cent while the UK increase was 3 per cent. For all other age 
groups suicide rates for women fell between the two periods. The same trend 
applies to men in Northern Ireland. These time periods are potentially useful 
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in terms of the impact of the conflict as they fall either side of the 1998 
Agreement. In the first period male suicide rates for Northern Ireland’s 
parliamentary constituencies are all within 25 per cent of the overall UK rate 
with the exception of three constituencies whose rates were between 25 and 
49 per cent lower.  In the second period, however, the position has changed 
so that only two constituencies have rates 25-49 per cent below the average 
for the UK, while one is now 25-49 per cent higher and two (Belfast North and 
Belfast West) are 50 per cent or more higher than the average.  In the first 
period, Northern Ireland had no constituencies with male suicide rates in the 
top twenty, whereas Scotland had fourteen, including the highest rate of 43 in 
Glasgow City.  
 
The local areas selected for comparison across the UK are not strictly 
comparable in Brock et al’s analysis. Local and Unitary Authorities were used 
for England and Wales, Council Areas for Scotland, and Parliamentary 
Constituencies for Northern Ireland – a total of 426 areas, but those with less 
than ten suicides in the relevant periods were excluded (2 areas for 1991-
1997 and 3 areas for 1998-2004). In the post 1998 period Belfast West had 
climbed from 259th to 13th place with a rate of 34.2 for men; Belfast North was 
ranked 319th in the pre-1998 period and 11th thereafter (1998-2004) with a 
rate of 35.4. A similar picture is presented by the suicide rates for women. In 
the first period, three constituencies have rates that are 25-49 per cent lower 
than the UK average while the remainder are within 25 per cent of the 
average. In the second period Belfast West had emerged with a rate (for 
women) 50 per cent or more higher than the UK average and Belfast East and 
Belfast North were in the 25-49 per cent above range.  
 
Using local authority areas only, Fitzpatrick et al (2001) mapped suicides for 
men and women across the UK for 1991-1997. While most of Scotland was 
shaded as ‘very high’ for males, all of Northern Ireland was ‘not significant’ 
apart from Belfast, shaded as ‘very low’. A more recent analysis of suicides by 
local authority area in Northern Ireland is presented in the Draft Suicide 
Prevention report published (DHSSPS 2006, para 2.12). The district council 
area with the highest suicide rate for the 1999-2003 period was Banbridge 
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(14.1). As can be seen in Figure 6, Banbridge was one of five council areas 
for which 5 suicides were registered in 2001 (excluding events of 
undetermined intent). Between 1999 and 2003, a total of 719 suicides were 
registered for Northern Ireland as a whole, of which 25 were Banbridge and 
158 in Belfast.  Although the numbers for many rural areas are small, the 
rates are nevertheless high, raising the question of whether there is a 
distinctive rural suicide problem associated with rural isolation and/or the 
particular problems facing farmers and rural communities.   
 
 
Figure 6: Rates and numbers of suicides by district council 
 
 
 
 
Of all the local areas examined by Brock et al the Shetland Islands had the 
highest suicide rate for men for 1998-2004 (47.1 per 100,000 population). But 
this was on the basis of 30 deaths recorded as suicide over seven years. 
Glasgow City, ranked worst in 1991-1997, recorded 964 suicides (706 men 
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and 258 women) for the years 1991-1997 and a further 912 (664 men, 248 
women) for 1998-2004. This compares to 93 suicides (75 men and 18 
women) in Belfast North and 79 (71 men and 8 women) in Belfast West in the 
same period.  
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Section 6 
 
The Social Characteristics of Suicides in Northern Ireland 
 
The numbers of suicides recorded for Northern Ireland each year over the 
past eleven years are shown in Figure 7 below. A total of 1,905 deaths were 
recorded as resulting from intentional self-harm or where the intent was 
undetermined, including the lowest number of 138 in 1997 and the highest 
number, 291 in 2006. Between these two dates, there was a 110 per cent 
increase in the number of men taking their own lives and a 113 per cent 
increase for women. The increase in the total number of suicides in Northern 
Ireland between 2003 and 2006 was 102 per cent. Given that the annual 
numbers are relatively small and affected by recording practices, trends are 
more satisfactorily shown using rolling averages over several years. Figure 8 
uses three year rolling averages and shows that 2004-06 had the highest 
average figure for the period and 1996-98 the lowest. Between 2002-04 and 
2004-06 the increase was 37 per cent, a significant rise in a short period. 
  
Figure 7: Gender of suicides  
 
Source: Registrar General Northern Ireland, Annual Report 2005. Belfast: Northern Ireland 
Statistics and Research Agency, 2006; Mortality Statistics, NISRA 22 March 2007. 
 
A detailed breakdown by age groups shows that recent increases in the 
numbers and rates of suicide are due mainly to the rise in self-harm among 
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Figure 8: Gender of suicides, three year rolling averages 
Source: Compiled from Registrar General Northern Ireland, Annual Report 2005. Belfast: 
Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, 2006. 
 
younger people. Figures 9 and 10 show the age profile of suicide rates for 
men and women respectively. Two years are compared representing the 
recent period of increase. The suicide rate for 25-34 year old men doubles 
between the two years. It rises by 35 per cent for the youngest age group and 
by 70 per cent for the 55-64 age group. By the year 2000 the rate for the 75+ 
group was down to a quarter of what it was for the 75+ group.  
 
Figure 9: Age profile of suicide rates for men 
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Source: Compiled from Samaritans (2006) Information Resource Pack 2006. 
 
For women there is a similar increase in the 25-34 year old group (the rate 
more than trebles) but the falls in suicide rates come in the 55-64 and 65+ 
groups Figure 10). 
  
Figure 10: Age profile of suicide rates for women 
Source: Compiled from Samaritans (2006) Information Resource Pack 2006. 
 
Figure 11 shows how the male suicide rate for selected age groups has varied 
over the past ten years. The 75+ group began the period with an above  
 
Figure 11: Male suicide rates by age 
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Source: Compiled from Samaritans (2006) Information Resource Pack 2006. 
 
average rate but, since 1997 has had a below average rate. The rise in rates 
for the younger age groups is very clear, although the groups peak in different 
years. The female rates follow a roughly similar pattern (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 12: Female suicide rates by age 
 Source: Compiled from Samaritans (2006) Information Resource Pack 2006. 
 
Figure 13: Number of male suicides by age, 1994-2004 
 Source: Compiled from Samaritans (2006) Information Resource Pack 2006. 
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Figure 14: Number of female suicides by age, 1994-2004 
Source: Compiled from Samaritans (2006) Information Resource Pack 2006. 
 
The contribution of each age group to the overall number of suicides is 
illustrated in Figures 13 and 14 for men and women respectively. The values 
shown in each column are for the numbers of suicides in the corresponding 
age group but it can be seen that proportionately the younger age groups 
account for the majority of suicides: over three-quarters (77%) of all male 
suicides were below the age of 45 in 2000 though the proportion has declined 
since then. For women, it is the 25 to 55 years olds that account for the 
majority of suicides (71% in 2000). 
 
A fuller picture of the characteristics of suicides is published by the National 
Confidential Inquiry (NCI). Since 1996, the National Confidential Inquiry into 
Suicide and Homicide by People with Mental Illness at Manchester University 
has been gathering data on all suicides in the UK. When notified of a suicide, 
the NCI seeks to establish if the person was in contact with mental health 
services within the last twelve months. If so, the suicide becomes an Inquiry 
case and the relevant psychiatrist is asked to complete a 28-page 
questionnaire that focuses on the patient’s treatment status but also provides 
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a picture of the social situation. Northern Ireland participates in the NCI but 
the most recent report on the last five years (April 2000 to December 2004) 
covers only England and Wales (National Confidential Inquiry, 2006).  
 
Little over a quarter of all suicides become Inquiry cases (27% over five 
years). Compared to all suicides in England and Wales, the ratio of male to 
female Inquiry cases is around 2:1 rather than 3:1, indicating that women 
suicides are relatively more likely to have had recent contact with mental 
health services. The NCI report provides a wealth of information about people 
taking their own lives, the circumstances they were in, their history of mental 
ill-health and their engagement with mental health services. About half of 
Inquiry cases experience a significant life event in the few months preceding 
the suicide, with relationship problems accounting for a half of these, 
accommodation problems 13 per cent and work problems including 
unemployment a further 11 per cent (NCI, 2006: 45). ‘Abnormalities of mental 
state or recent behaviour’ was found in 63 per cent of Inquiry cases, split 
between depressive illness and emotional distress. Twenty-one per cent of 
the sample were misusing both drugs and alcohol, 44 per cent alcohol alone, 
and 68 per cent had a history of self-harm. Nearly half were living alone, 69 
per cent were not currently married, and 68 per cent were either unemployed 
(40%) or long-term sick. Fourteen per cent were in-patients and the Inquiry 
cases included 55 prisoners under NHS care at the time they took their own 
lives. Just under half (46%) were diagnosed with affective disorder (‘bipolar 
disorder or depression’). Of all Inquiry cases, a half (49%) had been in contact 
with services within a week of their death and one fifth (19%) within 24 hours. 
 
Data from the NCI for the 1997-2002 period is included in McClelland (2005: 
77-8). Compared to Scotland and England and Wales, slightly higher 
proportions of Northern Ireland’s suicides were shown to have been in contact 
with mental health services in the last 12 months. They were significantly 
more likely to have a history of alcohol (59%) and drug misuse (36%), and 21 
per cent were regarded as alcohol dependent (England and Wales, 9%). A 
third were living alone (significantly fewer than England and Wales) and 55 
per cent were unemployed or long-term sick. Thirty-nine per cent were 
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diagnosed with affective disorder.  
 
Finally, there is a class profile to suicides. For men aged 20-64 in social class 
V, the risk of suicide was seven times that for men in social class 1 (based on 
men in Northern Ireland 1991-93) (Hillyard et al, 2005: 105).  
 
Method of suicide 
 
Little attention is given to the method of suicide in the literature on Northern 
Ireland.  The Draft Suicide Prevention Strategy gives a chart covering the five 
year period 1999-2003, based on suicides and events of undetermined intent. 
This shows that ‘hanging, strangulation and suffocation’ account for more than 
half of all suicides (52%) and self-poisoning a further quarter (27%). Nine per 
cent of suicides are attributed to drowning and seven per cent to firearms. The 
latter method is of particular interest as the conflict meant that Northern 
Ireland became a heavily armed society. 
 
Figure 15: Suicides by method over time 
Source: Registrar General Annual Reports and DHSSPS (2006). 
 
Using Registrar General Annual Reports, Figure 15 compares suicide method 
for three four year periods, one in the 1960s and the others in the 1980s and 
1990s. Although not strictly comparable the data from the Draft Suicide 
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Prevention Strategy report are added in the fourth column. Again, the figures 
(for the first three columns) should be used with caution as they are based on 
suicides excluding events of undetermined intent.  The trend for hanging etc is 
in line with Britain (Neeleman and Wessely) but the figures for poisons are 
not. The pattern for firearms, before and during the conflict and post-1998, are 
potentially significant as they indicate a substantial conflict-related effect.  
 
In summary, there was a sharp drop in the number of recorded suicides at the 
start of the conflict but since then the broad trend has been upwards both in 
terms of numbers and rates. Whether these observations reflect real suicide 
trends or are the outcome of changes in reporting and recording practices, 
cannot be determined from the literature. It would not be surprising to find that 
the early years of the conflict had a major impact on suicide registration given 
the breakdown of state authority in those very geographical areas where, on 
the basis of more recent evidence, higher suicide rates prevail.  
 
There has been an increase in Northern Ireland’s suicide rate since the mid-
1990s, an increase accounted for by younger people, particularly men, taking 
their own lives and this trend may have begun a downturn. The 2005 figures, 
however, establish a new high point. The recent rise in male suicide rates 
coincides with the peace process and the 1998 Agreement but is also in line 
with similar increases in Wales and Scotland. Over the last thirty years, 
however, Northern Ireland’s suicide trends and profiles more closely match 
those of the Republic of Ireland.  Finally, there are indications that the conflict 
impacted on the method of suicide with firearms playing a larger role. 
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Section 7 
 
Explaining Suicide Trends 
 
 
Brock et al’s examination of suicide trends explored the relationship of suicide 
to deprivation, but only for England and Wales. The conclusion was that ‘for 
both men and women, suicide rates for those living in the most deprived areas 
were double those living in the least deprived’ (2006: 16). The same exercise 
was carried out for Northern Ireland in the consultation paper on suicide. This 
came up with similar findings, namely that ‘in deprived areas the age 
standardised suicide rate over the last five years is 14.9 per 100,000 persons 
compared to a rate of 8.5 per 100,000 persons in non-deprived areas. When 
focusing solely on economic deprivation comparisons the suicide rate gap 
increased even further to 17.0 per 100,000 persons in economically deprived 
areas as opposed to a rate of 8.2 suicides per 100,000 persons in non-
economically deprived areas’ (DHSSPS, 2006: para, 2.9.).  
 
An analysis of suicides based on Section 75 categories,22 found that 15-34 
year old men had a rate of 50.1 for economically deprived areas and 21.6 for 
non-deprived areas (Information Analysis Directorate, n.d.). It also found a 
differential impact on Catholics though this was heavily qualified as a large 
proportion of Catholics are living in what were defined as ‘mixed’ areas. The 
study concluded that ‘the apparent differential impact in predominantly 
Catholic areas may actually be due to the deprivation/rurality of these areas’ 
(Information Analysis Directorate, n.d.: 18) 
 
While this is clearly a significant observation – and corresponds with other 
findings on the relationship between socio-economic groups and premature 
deaths, especially deaths from external causes (Kenway et al 2006: 106) – it 
does not help explain trends in suicide. 
                                                
22  Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 refers to nine categories of equality: Age, Marital status, 
Men and Women generally, Persons with a disability, Persons with dependants, Political opinion, Racial 
Group, Religious Belief, Sexual Orientation.  
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One of the arguments in the sociological literature is that it is not ‘deprivation’ 
as such that is associated with suicide, but the social isolation that often 
accompanies aspects of deprivation. This was the conclusion of Sainsbury’s 
study of London carried out in the 1950s (Sainsbury, 1971). The evidence of 
this study was that ‘indigenous poverty does not foster suicide’. What 
mattered most was social isolation: ‘the social and cultural isolation of the 
immigrant; the solitude of old age arising from lack of contemporaries to share 
values and outlook; the unemployed’s sense of social rejection; the ostracism 
resulting from infringement of a social taboo by divorce or a criminal act, or 
any similar activity that might diminish relatedness to the community.’ 
(Sainsbury, 1971: 254)  
 
Compared to Dorling and Gunnell, the latest National Statistics study was a 
basic analysis of the social factors that are associated with suicide. In their 
study of the ‘spatial components of despair’, Dorling and Gunnell (2003) used 
three measures to describe ‘social integration’ (or the lack of): the proportion 
of people who are single, the proportion not in work and the proportion who 
have recently migrated. These measures were then related to suicide data at 
parliamentary constituency level by age and gender over the period 1981 to 
2000. A number of models were developed to predict the suicide levels in 
every constituency. The researchers found that, 
by accounting for the varying influence of just three social indicators of 
isolation for the different age groups, sexes and at different time 
periods, it is possible to predict the number of deaths due to suicide 
and undetermined accidents across a great many areas quite closely. 
(Dorling and Gunnell, 2003: 455) 
Inward migration was a good predictor of suicide rates for most groups other 
than young men and women in the 25-34 group. Lack of work was particular 
associated with suicide for men aged 25-44 and young women. The affect of 
the proportion of single people in an area had most impact for those over the 
age of 34, though this measure may have been compromised by people being 
defined as ‘single’ (i.e. not married) yet living with someone. 
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War and suicide 
 
There is a specific debate in the research literature over the relationship 
between war and suicide, a debate that has been ongoing since Durkheim’s 
observations on nineteenth century Europe. Durkheim drew a number of 
conclusions about suicide that are of interest to this review. He showed that, 
contrary to the findings above, ‘Catholicism reduces the tendency to suicide 
while Protestantism increases it’ (Durkheim, 2002: 320). The Catholic 
countries of Ireland, Spain and Italy were found to have the lowest rates of 
suicide (2.1 in Ireland’s case in the 1880s). These three countries were the 
only ones where the numbers of homicides exceeded suicides – in Spain’s 
case by three times. Ireland had twice as many homicides than suicides each 
year on average during the 1880s. From this, Durkheim concluded that high 
rates of homicide confer ‘a sort of immunity against suicide’ (Durkheim, 2002: 
317). On the other hand, there were countries and regions within countries 
where high rates of suicides existed alongside low homicide rates, and yet 
others where suicide and homicide rates were both high: 
suicide sometimes coexists with homicide, sometimes they are mutually 
exclusive; sometimes they react under the same conditions in the same 
way, sometimes in opposite ways, and the antagonistic cases are the 
most numerous. (Durkheim, 2002: 322) 
Durkheim proposed that wars acted to ‘restrain’ the development of suicides 
(2002: 318).  He observed that in wartime, all crimes appear to decline, except 
that is the crime of homicide. In wartime the more typical pattern, therefore, 
was one of high homicide and low suicide. Wars ‘rouse collective sentiments, 
stimulate partisan spirit and patriotism, political and national faith, alike, and 
… cause a stronger integration of society’ (Durkheim, 2002: 166). When 
violence ceases, there is a ‘vacuum’ and suicide increases – an argument 
explicitly made in relation to Northern Ireland at the time of the 1998 
Agreement (British Medical Journal, 1998), though Durkheim suggested that 
war-related social integration ‘may not be purely momentary, but may 
sometimes outlive its immediate causes, especially when it is intense’ (2002: 
167). Reviewing recent sociological research, Stack (2000) argues that 
Durkheim’s observations do not hold for more recent violent conflicts. 
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Nevertheless, Durkheim’s basic idea remains a strong current in 
contemporary research (British Medical Journal, 1998). 
 
Bills and Li (2005) correlated homicide and suicide for 65 countries and found 
that overall, the relationship was weak. It was positive for European countries 
and negative for the Americas and the Asian Pacific Region but the classic 
war-suicide pattern identified by Durkheim was found for El Salvador, 
Colombia and the Philippines. On the other hand Sri Lanka’s civil war coexists 
with a high suicide rate. They conclude, ‘The complex relationship between 
war and suicide may reflect in part the varying effects of conflict on peoples’ 
attitudes towards death and dying in different societies and cultures’ (Bills and 
Li, 2005: 843). This at least opens up the possibility that the type of war or 
conflict is important in terms of integrating effects.  
 
Marshall (1981) looked at the effect of war on political integration in relation to 
suicide for the United States between 1933 and 1976, predicting that the 
second world war would depress suicide rates whereas the Korean and 
Vietnam wars would not. While the US suicide rates matched the prediction, 
Marshall suggests that this was more to do with the effects of the level of 
economic activity and unemployment than political integration induced by war. 
 
Another study focused on the second world war and suicide in Scotland – 
1931-52 was the period covered (Henderson et al, 2006). The long-term trend 
for both men and women over this period was for the suicide rate to fall, 
substantially so for men. Between 1940 and 1943, however, the male suicide 
rate increased, contrary to the main Durkheimian argument. The biggest 
increases were for men under 45 years old, especially those under 35. 
Female rates were more stable though women aged 35-44 had an elevated 
rate for two years in the early 1940s. When the principal method of suicide 
was examined it was found that ‘firearms and explosives’ was the only 
method that increased significantly during the war. The authors conclude: 
‘Younger men are the groups most likely to be called to arms, and to have 
access to guns. It seems likely, therefore, that the stresses of being a 
potential combatant, and access to lethal methods of selfharm, were 
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important contributors. This is supported by the minimal impact the war had 
on female suicide trends.’ (Henderson et al, 2006: 173) 
 
Van Tubergen and Ultee (2006) also argue for a refinement of Durkheim’s 
argument in the light of the experience of the second world war. They 
observed that suicides in the Netherlands were at a high level in 1940 and 
1945 which they explain in terms of the higher propensity to suicide among 
those who expected to be socially excluded as a result of German occupation 
and subsequent liberation. They identify two such groups: Jews at the start of 
the war and ‘political delinquents’ at the end of the war; both groups had high 
suicide rates at the relevant time. 
 
Another example of suicides increasing during war comes from the Balkans. 
Selakovic-Bursic et al (2006) examined suicides in Serbia and Montenegro, 
looking in particular at the wars of 1991-4 and 1999 (the period of NATO 
bombing). They make the important point that Durkheim’s argument about 
war and suicide was based on a type of war involving country against country. 
Within-country conflicts or civil wars – the most common type of conflict in the 
last quarter of the twentieth century (Hillyard et al, 2005: 23-5) – are unlikely 
to have the same dynamics regarding social integration. As in the Scottish 
study, the availability of firearms during and after the war years was an 
important factor in explaining the elevated suicide rates but unlike Scotland 
these were associated with older rather than younger age groups. Selakovic-
Bursic et al concentrate on what was happening with male suicide trends yet, 
untypically, the male/female suicide ratio was low (2:1) compared to many 
countries and actually dropped slightly during the first war period. The authors 
provide no explanation for why female suicides increased relative to male 
suicides during the first war period. 
 
 
Suicide and the Northern Ireland conflict 
 
There are two recent studies that deal with suicide and conflict-related deaths 
in the Northern Ireland context. One of these is based on suicide rates 
The Trouble With Suicide 
84 
 
(Lester, 2002) and the other on suicide numbers and rates (Mcgowan et al, 
2005). The former appears to be based on suicides without including 
undetermined deaths. For the period 1965 and 1997, Lester found that suicide 
rates and conflict deaths were significantly associated: suicide rates were 
higher when conflict deaths were lower (r=-.51). The fall in suicides at the 
onset of the ‘Troubles’ and its possible association with community 
polarisation and aggression was noted by Lyons as early as 1972. Kelly et al 
(2003) looked at anti-depressant prescribing practices and suicide rates, and 
found that the suicide rate for those aged under 30 was inversely related to 
the number of persons charged with terrorist offences. The conclusion was 
that a continuing decrease in terrorist offences may increase the suicide rate 
in those under 30 years, at least in the short term. There is also a study by 
McCrea (1996) that indirectly associates the conflict with suicide by arguing 
that it had a negative impact on economic development and hence on 
employment levels. This fits with Marshall’s argument in relation to the United 
States reviewed above. It also relates to a whole set of arguments about the 
economic impacts of the conflict (see Hillyard, 2005).  
 
McGowan et al based their study on coroners’ suicide verdicts, so excluded 
undetermined deaths. For conflict deaths they used McKittrick et al (1999) 
which includes some deaths that occurred outside Northern Ireland. This will 
have caused minor statistical distortions to calculations of population 
standardized rates. The study looked at age-related data, associating age of 
suicide with the total of those killed in the conflict and covering the years 1966 
to 1999. The strongest association was found for the 35-44 age group (r=-
.517). It is not clear why the authors explore an age related association of this 
kind, as the classic argument from Durkheim concerns the perpetrators of 
homicide (and those taking their own lives), not the victims. Male and female 
suicides were found to be inversely associated (r=-42; r=-44) with conflict 
deaths over the whole period. But the authors qualify their findings by noting 
that ‘graphical representation of the relationship shows two differing trends – 
the peak in homicide rates between 1970 and 1978 matched by a flat though 
gradually increasing trend in suicide rather than a more obvious inverse 
association’ (McGowan et al, 2005: 403). They also acknowledge that 
Section 7 
 85 
coroners may differ in their judgements which, in turn, impacts on the 
reliability of suicide data, but this is not seen as a critical issue.  
 
McGowan et al suggest that in the early years of the conflict especially, ‘civil 
unrest led to extreme polarization of communities and the ‘‘ghettoization’’ of 
large parts of Northern Ireland … We propose that the ‘‘Troubles’’ affected a 
social cohesion and ghettoization that had the effect of protecting its residents 
from suicide.’ (2005: 404) In making the same observation about suicide rates 
and conflict deaths, Fay et al (1997) suggest that far from protecting 
individuals, the conflict effectively suppressed the traumas of war that began 
to be expressed through the growth in victims groups in the 1990s, as well as 
in greater manifestations of individual psychological distress, depression and 
suicide.  
 
The idea that social cohesion is strong in Northern Ireland due to the conflict 
is picked up in a study that compared suicide notes from the United States 
and Northern Ireland. While there were more similarities than differences in 
the suicide notes examined, the Northern Ireland notes revealed a greater 
emphasis on family and interpersonal relationships. They ‘communicated 
issues around escaping from pain, distress, and feelings of loss and desertion 
from their closest companion (or other ideal) more often than those from the 
United States’ (63% and 30% respectively) (O’Connor and Leenaars, 2004: 
345). 
 
Much of the confidence of McGowan et al’s conclusion rests on accepting the 
figures that show suicides falling by half after 1969, while conflict deaths rose 
dramatically in the early 1970s – half of all conflict deaths occurring by 1976. 
The suicide records are questionable, however, as the level of conflict and 
unrest was such that there is a strong likelihood that processes of registration 
were affected.  
 
One possibility is that the fall in coroner determined suicides was due to more 
deaths being returned with open verdicts and registered as undetermined. 
Deaths registered as ‘events of undetermined intent’ formed a higher 
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proportion of all suicides and undetermined deaths in the early years of the 
conflict but from the late 1980s there was a more consistent relationship 
between the two (see Figure 16). These trends do not appear to be 
associated with the number of recorded suicides, however. The correlation 
between undetermined deaths and suicides from 1967 to 1985 suggests there 
is no association at all between the two (r=-.086). 
 
Figure 16: ‘Undetermined intent’ as a proportion of all suicides and 
undetermined deaths 
 
Source: Compiled from Registrar General Annual Reports 
 
 
Another possibility is that some suicides may have been registered as 
‘accidental’ deaths. Historically, the largest category of violent accidental 
deaths is from motor vehicle accidents, followed by ‘falls’. The latter can be 
traced as a single category in Registrar General reports up to 1994, but 
thereafter it becomes more difficult. Figure 17 puts these deaths alongside 
suicides (including undetermined deaths) for the period 1967-94. It is striking 
how these three causes of death diverge in the 1970s but converge in the 
1980s. By 1994 suicides have caught up with deaths from motor vehicle 
accidents.  
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Figure 17: Violent accidental deaths and suicides 
 
Source: Registrar General’s Annual Reports 
 
 
One of debates in the international literature on suicide is over car crash 
deaths, especially when the incident involves a vehicle occupied by one 
person. It has been suggested that up to 5 per cent of all car accident 
fatalities may be suicides, or at least parasuicides. Such motor vehicle 
‘accidents’ are thought to be especially characteristic of people engaging in 
the type of self-destructive behaviour associated with heavy consumption of 
alcohol and drugs, or those self-absorbed with depression or personal 
problems (Peck and Warner, 1995). Researchers have therefore sought to 
reconstruct the psychological state of those killed in single-occupancy vehicle 
crashes to see how closely this resembles what is known about the mental 
state of suicides. Another approach is to follow up what is sometimes referred 
to as the ‘Werther effect’23 whereby a well-publicised suicide is followed by a 
series of imitation suicides. Following Marilyn Munroe’s suicide, for example, 
there was a 12 per cent increase in suicides in the United States. So imitation 
is thought to be an important process in relation to suicide that can be 
investigated in relation to car crashes. 
                                                
23 Goethe’s novel The Sorrows of Young Werther, published in 1774 was thought to have led to a spate 
of suicides imitating the book – hence the so-called Werther effect. Thorson and Öberg, 2003 argue, 
however, that there is no evidence that the novel had this effect.  
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In his study of car crashes in California, Phillips (1979) found that fatalities 
rose considerably following suicides publicized in the press, especially on the 
third day after the story first appeared. Car crash deaths increased in line with 
the amount of publicity given and the effect was strongest in the area where 
the suicide took place. He also found that the imitation carried across age so 
that young suicides were followed by young car crash fatalities, while older 
suicides led to more older driver deaths. When suicide and murder stories 
were compared, Phillips found that different types of crashes seemed to be 
triggered – suicides led to more single occupancy deaths of drivers only, while 
murders led to multiple vehicle crashes, with driver and passenger deaths 
(Phillips, 1979: 1167). 
 
The data in Figure 17 show no statistically significant relationship between 
‘falls’ and suicides, but the association between motor vehicle deaths and 
suicides is highly significant (-.694, p=.001) and warrants further investigation.  
 
From Figure 18 it can be seen that it was not until 1984 that the number of 
registered suicides rose to the 1968 level. In the late 1960s, poisonings 
(including from gases) accounted for almost two-thirds of all suicides.  
 
Figure 18: Undetermined deaths and suicides, 3yr rolling averages 
Source: Registrar General Annual Reports 
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Eighty per cent of all suicides were from poisoning or drowning, ‘soft’ methods 
that are regarded as particularly prone to interpretation and therefore variable 
registration. Deaths from poisoning and drowning were therefore examined in 
more detail. Figure 19 shows the trends for registered accidental and suicide 
deaths attributable to drownings and poisonings (including from gases) 
between 1964 and 1984. Two periods are of particular interest. First, between 
1967 and 1972 there was a sharp fall in suicides from poisoning and 
drowning. From 1973 onwards the numbers are steadier until a sudden 
increase between 1981 and 1983. The cross-over point with deaths from 
poisoning and drowning registered as ‘accidental’ occurs in 1982. 
 
 
Figure 19: Registered deaths from poisoning and drowning 
 
Source: Registrar General Annual Reports 
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Table 1: Suicides and accidental deaths, Pearson correlation values  
 
 1967-82 1967-72 
   
Drowning  -0.267 -0.170 
   
Poisoning -0.681** -0.853* 
   
Poison gases -0.308 -0.759 
   
All poisons -0.609* -0.929** 
   
All poisoning and drowning -0.581* -0.781 
 
*Significant at .05 level (2-tailed); **significant at .01 level (2-tailed) 
 
Table 1 shows a number of correlation values for the two time periods 1967-
82 and 1967-72. The association between the number of ‘suicides’ and 
‘accidents’ each year for the short time period 1967-72 is highly significant for 
‘all poisons’ (p=.01) and for ‘poisoning’ (p=.05), but not for the other 
categories. Taking the longer time period, the correlation values are highly 
significant for poisoning and significant for all poisons and ‘all poisoning and 
drowning’. This clearly merits further investigation and points to a different 
‘troubles’ effect than that proposed by McGowan et al. Whatever the 
arguments about the integrating effects of the conflict within communities, the 
early years of polarization between communities and the alienation from state 
authority and institutions, may well have affected the reporting and registration 
of potential suicides, leading to more deaths being classified as ‘accidental’.  
 
While care is needed in making comparisons between societies in conflict, the 
early years of Northern Ireland’s ‘troubles’ arguably have some similarities 
with the situation pertaining in Israel and Palestine. One of the main points 
running through Dabbagh’s study of suicide in the West Bank, referred to 
earlier, is how conflict disrupts civil authority and bureaucracy. Conflict, 
particularly militarized conflict, is very disruptive to the medical, legal and 
bureaucratic processes involved in establishing a suicide. In general she 
found many discrepancies between community, hospital, media and police 
knowledge and recording of suicide. Conflict-related poor recording of suicide 
was compounded by other issues. For instance, Dabbagh is sceptical of the 
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claim that low numbers of suicides during the month of Ramadan are to do 
with the psychological and socially integrative impact of religious observance; 
rather, she suggests, it results from the fact that health care professionals and 
police are fasting (Dabbagh, 2005: 98). 
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Section 8 
 
Suicide and Transition to Peace 
 
 
No single year marks an end to the Northern Ireland conflict as such. It is 
more useful to think of a process of transition to peace that is characterized by 
gradual change and reductions in the forms of violence typical of the 1970s, 
1980s and much of the 1990s. Marked social and political divisions remain, 
but the way conflict is expressed is clearly changing: most violence is no 
longer militarized, and it is now more focused on the boundaries between 
communities and within communities themselves. These changing political 
and social relationships, as well as recent economic change, provide the 
context for seeking explanations for suicide trends over the last decade.      
 
Figure 20: Number of suicides by firearms and hanging 
Source: Registrar General Annual Reports 
 
 
As noted earlier, the proportion of suicides by firearms and hanging grew in 
the 1980s and 1990s, for hanging especially. Hanging has replaced poisoning 
as the dominant method of suicide and  now accounts for over half of all 
suicides in Northern Ireland. It is also the most common method in England 
and Wales.  
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Figure 20 charts the growth in the number of suicides in Northern Ireland by 
firearms and hanging. These two methods are highly correlated over the 
period shown (r=.855, p=.001) and even more so up to 1993 (r=.924, p=.001), 
after which firearms decline. Where firearms are relatively easy to acquire, 
such as in the U.S., they become the dominant method of suicide. In Northern 
Ireland this is not necessarily a ‘troubles’-related affect: it could reflect the 
levels of ownership of shotguns for hunting used by farmers and others, but 
the downturn in the proportion of suicides by firearms suggests otherwise. 
Clearly, this is worth further investigation.  
 
The growth of hanging (including suffocation) as a method of suicide is 
associated with the relative ease with which it can be carried out from 
commonly available materials and community settings, even in institutional 
settings such as prisons and hospitals. The trend may also reflect the efforts 
that have been made to make poisoning more difficult. In a study of suicides 
by hanging carried out in Bristol, Oxford and Manchester it was found that 
about 6 per cent of the total took place in prisons and hospitals (Bennewith et 
al, 2005). Some ‘hanging’ suicides involved drug overdoses as well. 
 
The vast majority of prison suicides are by hanging – 92 per cent of the 804 
people, including 93 young people (1997-2003), who took their own lives in 
English prisons over the ten year period from 1995 did so by hanging (Howard 
League, 2005: 4; Hansard, 16 July 2003, col. 372). In Northern Ireland’s 
prisons, ‘deaths are almost universally by hanging’, although the McClelland 
Report, which examined six prison suicides in the specific period 2002-04, 
does not provide figures for past years (McClelland, 2005: 35). Seventeen 
prisoners took their own lives during the 1990s in Northern Ireland, with some 
indications of a growing rate of suicide in the last ten years  (Hansard, 23 
October 2000: col. 23W; McClelland, 2005).  
 
Three women have  taken their own lives in Northern Ireland’s prisons since 
1996, all of whom were found hanging (Scraton and Moore, 2004). Typically 
the institutional response to self-harming by women prisoners is a special 
regime often involving use of punishment cells, long periods of isolation, and 
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‘anti-suicide suits’, while simple measures such as anti-ligature windows are 
absent. The regime was found to be so negative that it is questionable that 
the term suicide applies (Scraton and Moore, 2005).  
 
 
Vulnerable communities 
 
There is an assumption that the transition to peace involves a reduction in 
social and political integration across the board within protestant/unionist and 
catholic/nationalist communities, and that this is allowing suicide rates to rise 
(McGowan et al, 2005). This is too simple. Some peoples and communities 
were relatively untouched by the conflict, while others lived in neighbourhoods 
on a quasi war footing for decades. Divisions within the communities may be 
as important as divisions between them. Any theorizing around polarization 
and social integration needs to take account of wide variations in experience. 
 
While the impact of conflicts have many universal features, it is clear that 
some communities experienced the conflict more intensely than others, and in 
different ways (Hillyard et al, 2005). As has been acknowledged in the context 
of mental health there is a ‘clear link between poor mental health and living in 
those neighbourhoods which both are economically disadvantaged and have 
experienced greater exposure to the Troubles’ (Department of Health, Social 
Services and Public Safety, 2003: 19). The patterns of violent deaths and 
personal experience of conflict are strongly associated with geographical 
areas with the highest rates of poverty and multiple deprivation (Fay et al, 
1999). A number of studies by Cairns and Wilson (1991; Wilson and Cairns, 
1992; Cairns, 1996) found a link between the level of political violence in 
different areas and psychological wellbeing. Earlier, attention was drawn to 
very high rates of suicides in some areas of Northern Ireland, in particular 
North and West Belfast parliamentary constituencies. The finding that suicide 
rates are twice as high (and more for some age groups) in areas of economic 
deprivation provides further evidence of the need to look into this relationship 
more precisely, as it is by no means clear that all disadvantaged areas are 
affected to the same extent or in quite the same way. Snyder (1992) found 
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that suicide and unemployment were significantly associated for men for two 
age groups only (15-24 and 45-54) but no association was found for women. 
Also, O’Connor and Sheehy’s finding (1997) on the similarity of female suicide 
rates for Northern Ireland with those in the UK and Ireland raises interesting 
questions about the variable impact of the ‘Troubles’ by gender. 
 
There have been few attempts to construct a geography of the ‘Troubles’. 
This may be because relevant data are unavailable or because ‘troubled 
areas’ were so much a part of common sense knowledge that it was 
unnecessary to define them in terms of victimization, violent incidents and/or 
perpetrators. Lack of appropriate data appears to be the main reason for not 
incorporating a measure of the ‘Troubles’ into the Noble index of multiple 
deprivation (Noble et al, 2001) But there is some evidence that begins to link 
experience of the conflict with socio-economic circumstances and hence 
spatial concentrations of multiple deprivation. The Poverty and Social 
Exclusion study (Hillyard et al, 2003), for example, constructed a measure of 
‘extreme violence’ which combined several factors: witnessing a murder, the 
death of a close relative, and injury to self or a close relative. Those who had 
experienced ‘extreme violence’ had much higher poverty rates than the 
general population. They also experience greater levels of medium and high 
stress Hillyard et al 2005: 130-140).  
 
Area-based analyses raise problems that are both theoretical and practical 
(Tomlinson and Kelly, 2003). Those who argue that area effects are real and 
important are typically supportive of area-based policy interventions (Smith et 
al, 2001). They argue that a ‘disadvantaged area’ means something more 
than a collection of disadvantaged individuals (Spicker, 2001). The validity or 
otherwise of area-based approaches are clearly of special interest in Northern 
Ireland where social and spatial polarisation are intense, and where the sense 
of territorial allegiance and belonging are strong. In terms of psychosocial 
factors the stresses that are involved in maintaining, challenging or 
negotiating social and territorial boundaries are especially acute at community 
interface areas. There is some evidence of worsening interface tensions in the 
last ten years (Jarman, 2002).  
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Such emphasis on the social organization of communities is not common 
currency in the public debates around suicide in Northern Ireland. Rather the 
emphasis is on specific individual pathologies or on a lingering ‘Troubles’ 
effect, such as the trauma of those caught up in violent events or the personal 
consequences of the punitive activities of paramilitary groups especially in 
relation to young men in North Belfast (BBC News, 16 and 17 February, 
2004). But a more fruitful line of inquiry may be the social processes within 
confined communities that lead to clusters of suicides. The ideas of 
‘contagion’ and imitation have a long history in suicide research, as noted 
earlier, with recent research claiming that 10 per cent of all suicides may be 
explained in this way (Gould et al, 1989; McKenzie et al, 2005). 
 
The ‘two communities’ are not necessarily under the same influences as 
regards social and political integration, or have similar propensities to social 
isolation. The capacities for resilience and mutual support will vary. The 
communities themselves are divided in terms of class, religion and political 
affiliations, and have different demographic profiles. The religions vary in the 
extent of the allegiance they attract and their influence within communities 
over time. Protestantism was always thought to be less of a protective factor 
against suicide than Catholicism (Durkheim, 2002: 342-4) It is often 
commented that the economically disadvantaged protestant communities, 
particularly in Belfast, lack ‘community infrastructure’ and social capital, that 
the loyalist paramilitary groups have been unable to develop a strong political 
organization and ideology to challenge the major unionist parties, and that the 
loyalist areas are dominated by intra-paramilitary turf wars. Recent intra-
loyalist conflict has involved forced moves and family separations, raising 
insecurity and social isolation.  More broadly, the transition to peace and the 
problems surrounding political compromise have presented unionism with 
challenges out of which a unifying and integrating response has not been 
forthcoming. All of this does suggest less coherence and less integration, but 
the tendencies described are nothing new and are intrinsic to the conflict 
rather than a post-conflict development. For a war or conflict to be integrating, 
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it needs to be popular and unifying across all aspects of everyday life; few 
would claim this of the Northern Ireland conflict. 
 
Nor should it be assumed that the ‘nationalist community’ was more 
integrated ten, fifteen or twenty years ago than it is at the present time. The 
growth of republicanism as a political force might suggest greater political 
integration in the present than in the 1970s and 1980s. But there are other 
forces at work such as a decline in the authority of Catholicism, improvement 
in the integration of Catholics in the labour market, and what some regard as 
a loss of idealism associated with political compromise and the peace 
process. Experience of the conflict has often led to divorce and separation, 
difficulties in finding work (especially for ex-prisoners) and migration, all of 
which point to social isolation rather than social integration, and which may 
help to explain the finding that Catholics are more at risk of suicide than 
Protestants . The peace process has also raised expectations, both political 
and economic, yet these expectations may seem not to have been fulfilled for 
younger people living in the most marginalized neighbourhoods. 
 
The above points highlight the fact that there is no research to date that 
amounts to a detailed sociological autopsy of contemporary suicide in 
Northern Ireland. While there is a rich body of available data on the protective 
and indicative factors that are related to suicide, this has not been applied in a 
systematic way that relates to specific (and different) local communities and 
populations, notwithstanding the widespread view that there is a direct 
connection between the areas worst affected by conflict, poor mental health 
and suicide. Further, there is a lack of qualitative research exploring how 
families and local communities cope with depression, self-harming and 
suicide, and how knowledge of, and attitudes towards potential sources of 
help vary.   
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From vulnerable areas to individuals at risk 
 
While area-based research on local communities is essential, social problems 
are not always sufficiently concentrated to justify local area-based 
interventions (which have become more prevalent since the late 1990s). To 
illustrate, the 20 per cent most disadvantaged electoral wards in 2001 
captured only 40 per cent of child poverty and the worst 10 per cent, a quarter 
of child poverty. In the mental health field, depression and anxiety are 
estimated to affect between a fifth and a quarter of the population at any one 
time according to the Bamford Report (2006).  The prevalence figures for 
mental health problems in Northern Ireland are thought to be at least 25 per 
cent higher than in England. One indication of the difference is that the 
proportion of people in Northern Ireland in receipt of Disability Allowance for 
mental health reasons is three times the figure for Britain. The Northern 
Ireland figure doubled between February 1998 and 2006 (Kenway et al, 2006: 
111). Certainly the use of prescribed sedatives, tranquillisers and anti-
depressants runs at very high levels – 22 per cent of the population have 
used these drugs compared to 12 per cent in the Irish Republic. The volume 
of prescribed anti-depressants almost doubled between 1989 and 1993, but 
then trebled between 1993 and 2000 (National Advisory Committee on Drugs, 
2003). Over the ten year period 1989-1999, there was a 5.7 fold increase in 
the volume of prescribed antidepressants (Kelly et al, 2003). In 2005, 1.4 
million anti-depressant prescription items were issued in Northern Ireland, or 
.78 prescription items per head (Hansard, 2 May 2006, col. 1478W). 
 
There is no clear evidence as to whether such increases are a reflection of a 
greater recognition of mental health needs by professionals, a change in the 
willingness of people to seek help, or a real change in the prevalence of 
mental illness. But the high levels of prescriptions bring into sharp focus 
contemporary debates around pharmaceutical-based responses to problems 
such as depression. On the one hand there is the argument that the increase 
in antidepressant prescribing in Northern Ireland could be associated with a 
reduction in the suicide rate.  One study found a statistically significant 
association (for the years 1989-1999) between antidepressant prescribing and 
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a decrease in the suicide rate in the population over 30 years of age (but no 
association for those aged under 30 years) (Kelly et al, 2003). Against this, 
there were over 4,700 antidepressant-related deaths in the decade up to 2002 
in England and Wales, 80 per cent of which were recorded as suicides. 
Donovan et al (1999) examined 222 suicides from Britain, Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland occurring in the early 1990s, and found that 18.5 
per cent had been prescribed an antidepressant within one month of the 
suicide. Comparing selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors and tricyclic 
antidepressants, it was found that suicide by any method was more likely 
following prescription of the former, but this may have been a reflection of 
prescribing practice rather than of the drug itself. There is now a ‘Prozac 
backlash’ (Glenmullen, 2000), fuelled by official warnings against the use of 
selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors for children and even backed up by the 
manufacturers themselves.24  Such concern is likely to lend support to those 
supporting a shift in policy from pharmaceuticals towards ‘talk’-based 
responses. Further research is needed to explain anti-depressant prescribing 
trends and to evaluate the efficacy of this intervention in relation to self-
harming and suicide.  
 
The growth in prescriptions for anti-depressants in the past decade, it is 
widely believed, has been matched by a parallel growth in illicit drug use. 
Higgins and McElrath (2000) challenge the view that the 1990s ceasefires led 
to a rapid growth in illicit drugs use as, they argue, the evidence is simply not 
available. The ‘trouble with peace’ is that it led to a redeployment of police 
resources which had the affect of increasing drug seizures and arrests. Some 
paramilitary groups were also developing new roles reflecting their differing 
drugs ideologies (Higgins and McElrath, 2000: 55). The drugs ‘epidemic’ was 
more a matter of discovery and media exposure. The ceasefires allowed 
greater awareness and public debate to surface around drugs but did not lead 
to, or coincide with, a sudden surge in illicit drug use. The only exception to 
this is heroin, for which there is evidence of increased notifications. But there 
                                                
24 GlaxoSmithKline, manufacturers of the leading SSRI, Seroxat (19 million prescriptions for which were 
written in Britain in 2003), wrote to all doctors in May 2006 warning of the risk of suicide associated with 
the use of the drug for some adults. The Guardian, 13 May 2006. There is also a concern over Tamiflu 
(made by Roche) which is implicated in 54 deaths in Japan since 2001. The Japanese health ministry 
has warned doctors not to prescribe the drug to teenagers. The Guardian 22 March 2007.  
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is no evidence that this development can be related specifically to transition to 
peace.  
 
A less sceptical view is put forward in a further review of the evidence four 
years later. Drug use was found to have increased, even ‘flourished’, with an 
enhanced role for some of the paramilitary organisations. Northern Ireland 
has been ill-prepared for this in terms of drugs policies and harm reduction 
strategies (Higgins et al, 2004).  
 
The consumption of alcohol has also increased from the 1990s with the 
proportion of men drinking ‘above sensible levels’ rising from 9 per cent in 
1986 to 19 per cent in 2000. For women the figure rose from 3 to 9 per cent. 
By 2000, 9 per cent of male drinkers were consuming ‘dangerous’ levels of 
alcohol (Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency, 2002; Health 
Promotion Agency for Northern Ireland, 2002). 
 
Such patterns indicate that over the past decade in Northern Ireland key risk 
factors traditionally associated with suicide at the individual level – 
depression, alcohol and drugs problems – have all increased. Other known 
risk factors such as relationship breakdown (Fernquist, 2003) and sexual 
abuse need to be addressed. But the key challenge at this level is to explore 
any evidence of higher than average prevalence of risk factors among those 
who were in the frontline of violence, whether actively or passively. One would 
expect that individuals involved in carrying out violent acts, those involved in 
policing violence and managing prisoners, ambulance and fire crews dealing 
with death and injury after bombings and shootings, and those unwittingly 
caught up in violent incidents, the bereaved and injured, are all at risk of 
above average trauma and stress-related effects. The latter do not 
necessarily manifest as psychological issues, but may emerge as physical 
morbidity and premature death from heart disease or cancers (Wilkinson, 
1996). 
 
Not surprisingly, research on the mental health affects, particularly suicide, for 
those in the front line of military and civil conflict is controversial. It also has 
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consequences for public policy. For example, in November 2005, more than 
5,000 former and serving police officers launched a class action suing their 
employer on the grounds that they were not adequately protected from 
‘injuries’ including post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression 
which they argue are predictable psychiatric consequences of ‘the extremely 
traumatic nature of their duties’ (Police Federation, 2005). Searches carried 
out for this review revealed only one reference to suicide among police 
officers in Northern Ireland. This was on the Police Federation’s website 
which states: ‘levels of stress-related illness have been higher than in any 
other police force: almost 70 officers have committed suicide, many of them 
with RUC-issued weapons’. (www.policefed-ni.org.uk) Gilligan (2006) cites a 
study by Patterson et al (2001) based on interviews with 20 retired RUC 
officers, nine of whom were assessed as psychologically distressed. Two of 
their interviewees wondered ‘what was it all for?’ and felt particularly 
depressed because of the 1998 Agreement’s provisions for the early release 
of prisoners (Gilligan, 2006: 330). There is some evidence that the children of 
police officers have special psychological needs arising from their parent’s 
police service and a specialist Child and Adolescent Therapy Service has 
been established to address these needs (Black, 2004).   
 
Similarly, there is an ongoing debate over the impact of the war in Iraq and 
how PTSD should be understood (Wessley, 2005). The US Army has been 
accused of covering up a ‘suicide crisis’ and of failing to investigate 
adequately a number of murder-suicides involving soldiers returning from 
frontline operations in Iraq (Newsweek 20 Feb. 2004). There is contradictory 
research surrounding the war in Iraq. A team working for Defence Medical 
Services examined the mental health of 254 members of the UK’s Air Assault 
Brigade deployed in Iraq and found an improvement following combat, 
contrary to Hoge et al (2004). They conclude: ‘where there are highly selected 
forces with high morale involved in focused operations with positive 
outcomes, whatever the immediate political context, participation in war 
fighting may sometimes not necessarily be as deleterious to psychological 
well-being as has previously been thought’ (Hughes et al, 2005: 537). Other 
research has found that depression is more common than PTSD among 
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British ex-service personnel (Iversen et al, 2005).  
 
Combat Stress, the ex-Services Mental Welfare Society, claims that the 
largest single group needing help are from Northern Ireland and many of 
these are ex-Ulster Defence Regiment personnel who remain concerned 
about their personal security (BBC News 27 September 2005). No supporting 
evidence appears to be publicly available. Suicides among UK regular armed 
forces are analysed annually by the Defence Analytical Services Agency 
(DASA). The latest report states that suicide rates for men are lower than in 
the general population except for young men (<20) for whom the risk of 
suicide is 50 per cent higher. Taking all armed forces suicides from 1984 to 
2005 (a total of 638), 26 per cent were open verdicts, a much higher rate than 
for all suicides in Northern Ireland (DASA, 2006). Unfortunately, no attempt is 
made to relate the data to combat experience or service in Northern Ireland 
though parliamentary questions have been raised over the deaths of particular 
individuals (see Hansard, 12 December 2002, col. 427W). The suicide figures 
have been questioned in the context of four deaths at Deepcut barracks which 
highlighted other deaths and issues of institutionalised bullying. As one MP 
put it,  
Young soldiers are dying needlessly in barracks in Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, in Germany and Bosnia… In many regiments, there is 
evidence of a culture of extreme bullying, routine violence and sexual 
harassment that constitutes torture and inhuman and degrading 
treatment. (Hansard, 4 February 2003, col. 3WH) 
Since 1990, 1,748 armed forces personnel died of non-natural causes in or 
around barracks and 100 of these were firearms related. The implication is 
that some armed forces ‘suicides’ are either manslaughter or murder, and that 
some ‘accidents’ are in fact suicides.  
 
No studies of suicide among prison officers, ambulance crews or the fire 
service in Northern Ireland could be traced. Occasionally, evidence of 
occupational stress among prison officers emerges. In 2003 the Northern 
Ireland Affairs Committee heard evidence on absenteeism in the Prison 
Service which was running at 11 per cent at the time. Half of this was 
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attributed to anxiety and depression; it was also related to low morale due to 
political tensions over the segregation of prisoners (Northern Ireland Affairs 
Committee, 2004). A systematic review of the health of ambulance service 
personnel found high PTSD scores and high anxiety compared to general 
populations but many studies suffer from poor sampling and statistical testing 
(Sterud et al, 2006). The review included one study of ambulance personnel 
in Northern Ireland. This looked at early retirements by cause, comparing 
ambulance staff with other health service workers. Compared to studies 
elsewhere, Rodgers (1998) found the highest proportion of ambulance 
retirements due to mental disorders, a high proportion of which were related 
to problems with alcohol. Somewhat tentatively, Rodgers concludes: ‘Perhaps 
the multiple shooting and bombing incidents which in the past have occurred 
frequently in N. Ireland may partly explain the higher incidence of mental 
disorders at retirement of the ambulance personnel in the present study 
compared to those cited in other studies.’ (1998: 129) 
 
Very high rates of imprisonment and long-term sentences in the past will have 
taken their toll on relationships and mental health. Shirlow et al (2005) argue 
that the transition to peace has led to a greater willingness on the part of ex-
prisoners and former combatants to acknowledge psychological impacts and 
mental health problems. They interviewed 150 Loyalist and 150 Republican 
former prisoners (and half that number of relatives) and found that 39 per cent 
of Republicans relatives and 28 per cent of Loyalist relatives felt that 
imprisonment had negatively affected their relationship with the prisoners. 
‘Serious psychological trauma’ was reported, though the form of questions 
asked is unclear. There were differences between Loyalists and Republicans 
in this respect, with higher proportions of Republican prisoners (24%) and 
relatives (28%) than Loyalists (17% and 8%) reporting trauma. The issue of 
suicide was not explored, though there have been suicides among former 
political prisoners. With no clear victory or defeat, and with faltering political 
development, ex-police officers are not the only ones struggling to make 
sense of the transition to peace and asking what people fought and died for. 
 
Horgan and Kilkelly (2005) review the evidence on how children have been 
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affected by a parent’s imprisonment relating to the conflict. Two studies report 
that children were damaged emotionally by not being told the full story behind 
why the parent was in prison. A study of the children of Loyalist former 
prisoners found that ‘they suffered depression, anxiety and panic attacks as 
well as general confusion and worry. Teachers, parents and children 
themselves noticed changes in behaviour including an increased tendency 
towards violence and a withdrawal from friends.’ (Horgan and Kilkelly, 2005: 
11) Children/ex-prisoner relationships were difficult. It has also been shown 
that teachers and other professionals have little comprehension of the issues 
facing ex-prisoners and their children (Kilkelly et al, 2004). These findings 
reflect the concern in the international literature about how some of the effects 
of traumatic experiences are passed on to other family members, especially 
children – the ‘intergenerational transmission of trauma’ (Bar-On, 1996; 
Dulmus and Wodarski, 2000).25 In their group work with families living in areas 
worst affected by Northern Ireland’s conflict, Burrows and Keenan (2004: 111) 
identify ‘a gap in current thinking in relation to the complex parent–child 
relationship in times of political conflict’. If child trauma is recognized at all, it 
tends to be ‘individualised through counselling or medication’. But this ignores 
the fact that ‘children here are born into an already traumatised environment’ 
(2004: 112) and how intergenerational trauma is transmitted through 
processes of attachment, memory, re-enactment, family and community 
responses. The authors refer to youth suicide as an example of how traumatic 
events are consciously or subconsciously re-enacted. The work of the NOVA 
project also reflects these perspectives (Murphy and Stewart, 2006). 
 
 
Mental health services and the conflict 
 
As Northern Ireland gradually emerges from conflict, the debate has grown 
over the identification of conflict-related psychological damage and 
appropriate responses through mental health services. Curran and Miller 
(2001) argue that psychiatric services have always been in good shape in 
                                                
25 Children have, of course, been traumatised directly from specific incidents. See McDermott et al 
(2004). 
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Northern Ireland. There has been no shortage of candidates to fill psychiatric 
posts, hospital and community services are ‘generous’ compared to Great 
Britain, doctors are well-respected and they have ‘gathered the experience of 
dealing with victims of violence, learned best classification systems of 
psychological reactions to trauma and developed treatment techniques to best 
apply in different and individual circumstances’. (2001: 73) But, they argue, 
the need for conflict-related responses is not as great as people imagine as 
only 6 per cent of referrals and admissions at the Mater Hospital – located in 
an area of Belfast that has experienced a third of all conflict deaths – can be 
seen as connected to violence (see also Loughrey, 1997). The vast majority 
of the clinical practice, therefore,  
is the same as that of colleagues elsewhere in the British Isles …Our 
people who commit parasuicidal acts seem to do so by reason of the 
same litany of life’s vicissitudes as anywhere else… In psychological 
post-mortem studies and observations we have not noted any 
correlation between the community violence and the personal 
circumstances of the victims of completed suicide and we assume the 
reasons for the high suicide rate are similar to those in other 
jurisdictions. (2001: 75-6)  
While people and services have coped well, Curran and Miller do observe ‘a 
rising trend in people seeking acknowledgement of victimhood’ associated 
with the decline in violence (2001: 79). 
 
The conflict may have had little impact on the psychiatric case load at the 
Mater Hospital, but there is a broadly held view within the health and social 
care professions that the effects of ‘the troubles’ are much wider than people 
realise and have not properly registered on services. A Northern Ireland 
Social Services Inspectorate report (1998: 4) spoke of ‘an ever widening circle 
of individuals affected, socially, psychologically and economically … The 
ripples are endless and no-one knows the total number of people affected’. 
This is supported by much of the research and evidence presented earlier, 
from survey data on poor mental health to high rates of consumption of 
alcohol and prescription and other drugs, and of course the prevalence of 
suicide itself.  
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This points to a discrepancy between widespread mental health needs and 
the provision of services, including possible issues over the form and nature 
of mental health services and interventions. Put simply, there appears to be a 
gap between those with the strongest mental health needs living in the areas 
most affected by conflict and the professionals who provide mental health 
services (Hayes and Campbell, 2005: 118-128). The possible exception here 
are GPs who are responding to depression and anxiety by prescribing ever 
higher quantities of anti-depressants. This is not simply a communications 
gap; one of not knowing where to go, who to contact and what to expect on 
arrival. It is also about the distance between the ‘neutrality’ of professionals 
and the perspectives within local communities that arise from their 
experiences of conflict (see, for example, Murphy and Stewart’s (2006) work 
addressing the community trauma of the Holy Cross dispute). 
 
In relation to suicide prevention the Draft Suicide Prevention Strategy Report 
notes the need for the promotion of safer prescribing of antidepressants. It 
also notes that a training programme in depression awareness for GPs was 
not delivered by the target date of September 2004. In fact most of the 
Report’s targeted actions to 2008 involve bridging gaps between high risk 
individuals, community and voluntary groups and professionals. There is less 
clarity over specific action points. For instance, what will be done with better 
linkages when they are established? How will vulnerable men’s emotional talk 
capacity be improved? The strategy does not recognize that young women 
have specific needs and vulnerabilities in relation to harming and attempted 
suicide. No new programmes to complement or challenge pharmaceutical 
approaches to mental health are mentioned in the Report. While community 
and voluntary groups are seen as key bridges between high risk people and 
professionals, there seems to be no commitment to strengthen community 
capacities and networks, including networks with those outside Northern 
Ireland. Similarly, there appears to be no intention to pull together in a 
systematic way the knowledge and experience of community leaders and 
those bereaved through suicide. Finally, the Report could do more to 
recognise the importance of suicide imitation and the role of media (see 
Samaritans, 2002). There is a target to agree reporting guidelines with 
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journalists and to ‘develop and implement positive media messages’, but no 
attempt to target the approach in ways that are meaningful to key risk groups 
and communities. In particular, there is a need to engage with new media and 
how younger people use these.  
 
These observations fit with one of the main themes running through this 
review, that the conflict radically altered the nature and quality of relationships 
between state bodies and those communities and individuals now recognised 
as most affected by decades of various forms of violence. Changes in these 
relationships have shaped the registration of suicides, the recognition of the 
suicide problem and the speed and nature of the responses to it.  
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Section 9 
 
Conclusion 
 
Has the Northern Ireland conflict affected mental health and suicide? There 
are two simple answers to this question running through the literature 
reviewed in this report. The first is that ‘the troubles’ have not had much 
effect: there was no obvious growth in mental illness, suicides went down and 
direct experience of trauma was modest. The conflict had few consequences 
for, and little impact on, services and generally people have coped well. 
Hence Northern Ireland’s mental health and suicide profiles today reflect 
those of any other ‘normal’ population, albeit one with traditionally high levels 
of social disadvantage.  
 
The second answer is that ‘the troubles’ affected everything. The whole 
society has been traumatised, brutalisation is common, resistance to change 
engrained, and depression and anxiety are widespread. It is only in recent 
years that the full effects are coming to light through the work of victims’ 
groups, new demands on services and mass medication with anti-
depressants. In particular, suicides have risen and fallen in line with conflict 
killings, and it is only to be expected that suicide rates have gone up as 
murder has declined. The aggressions of homicide become internalised and 
more people kill themselves. 
 
Inevitably the picture is more contradictory than either of these two scenarios. 
People in Northern Ireland report higher levels of happiness than in many 
other parts of Europe and elsewhere. Yet this sits alongside high levels of 
unhappiness and psychological distress. Wars do damage to people and 
places, and the refugee (or ‘internal displacement’) experience contributes 
further to the cocktail of economic distortion, non-employment and social 
disruption, including intimate partner violence, and associated chronic levels 
of fatigue, inability to enjoy life, anxiety and depression. In most societies the 
burden of the latter falls disproportionately on women who are more likely 
than men to contemplate suicide, but less likely to carry it out. 
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Modern types of violent conflicts do not appear to generate the same levels of 
social and political integration traditionally associated with national 
mobilisations for war between countries. Contemporary conflicts are often 
ideologically incoherent and divisive within the fighting parties as well as 
between them. Maintaining military capacity and civilian support is messier 
and more of a struggle, causing further divisions and insecurities. Trauma is 
particularly high in populations fleeing conflict or who are forced to move 
through intimidation and violence. Conflict related trauma has been shown to 
have long-term effects which are still being understood in terms of physical 
and mental consequences. Increased rates of suicide have been associated 
with both the immediate and longer-term consequences of conflicts, especially 
in situations where it is difficult for populations to re-establish themselves 
economically. But evidence is by no means complete on these points. Further, 
researchers are divided over the concept, measurement and applicability of 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.  
 
For some, the recognition of PTSD represents a major advance in 
understanding and dealing with the consequences of a range of unexpected 
events, including disasters, and the experience of violence arising from 
political conflicts. For others, the popularisation of PTSD constitutes the 
unnecessary medicalisation of distress on a global scale, and may even do 
more harm than good. Northern Ireland is clearly caught up in this argument 
as doctors, therapists and others compare their practices and debate their 
contributions to people’s private troubles and Northern Ireland’s transition to 
peace. This is of some importance to suicide as when conflicts end people are 
confronted even more starkly by the question, ‘what was it all for?’, whether 
those people were in the frontlines of the conflict or bereaved as a result of it.  
 
The evidence that experience of the conflict is associated with poorer mental 
health is strong. Population-based surveys show several things. First, those 
who experienced most violence have significantly higher rates of depression 
than those with little or no experience. People whose areas had been heavily 
affected by violence had very high rates of depression. Another point is that, 
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as the transition to peace progressed, people were more willing to report 
these associations. So the relationship between conflict experience and poor 
mental health, and between lack of conflict experience and good mental 
health, is well-established. 
 
How important this is to suicide is less certain. Most people who take their 
own lives are known to be suffering from depression. But only a minority are 
being treated for a recognized disorder or illness. Women suicides are much 
more likely than men to have been diagnosed with depression, though women 
are significantly less likely than men to kill themselves. Understanding suicide 
simply as the outcome of psychological sickness or in terms of biology, 
however, provides only part of the picture.  
 
Research on suicide relies heavily on official data and it has long been 
recognized that the reliability of that data is questionable. Some researchers 
abandon the use of official statistics altogether as they can never adequately 
reveal the nature and extent of deaths by suicide. Others argue that what is 
important is the social processes through which a suicide statistic is arrived at. 
These processes change over time as legal, religious, medical, commercial 
and bureaucratic definitions and practices develop. They also vary between 
countries notwithstanding international attempts to standardize the 
classification of deaths and to assemble a credible international set of data.  
 
In Northern Ireland as elsewhere, there is a considerable discrepancy 
between the number of suicides that are thought to occur in a given year and 
those that come to be registered and published in reports and press releases. 
Registrations are lower than occurrences and proposals are on the table for 
how practices could be improved, including changes to the role of Coroners, 
doctors and the General Register Office. It is not really sensible to establish 
suicide reduction targets when the statistical representation of suicide has not 
been settled. That does not mean, of course, holding back on the objective of 
preventing suicides. 
 
The occurrence/registration difference is not the only problem, however. The 
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way in which evidence of self-harming is currently captured means that 
knowledge of the problem is very limited. Most self-harming does not come to 
the attention of health and social care professionals. This is a known issue 
and progress is needed as a matter of priority so that the ways in which 
anxiety, distress and depression are being experienced and expressed by 
younger people can be better understood and supported. 
 
A large section of this report dealt with trends in recorded suicides globally 
and within Britain and Ireland. The standard data sets allow analysis by age 
and gender and the profiles for both these dimensions vary radically between 
countries and regions and over time. Some of the differences can be seen to  
reflect recording practices. Others, according to the literature, can be 
understood in terms of religion, rapid social change, gender relations, culture 
or the availability of the means of suicide.  
 
Even within the European Union statistical reliability is quite uneven. The 
boundary between ‘suicides’ and deaths for which the intention is unclear 
shifts from one country to another. In any event, no clear explanation is 
advanced for the age and gender differences between countries, and suicide 
rates across the EU are not related to unemployment and risk of poverty. 
Male suicide rates are moving in different directions in different countries with 
the strongest increase belonging to Ireland where young men are four times 
as likely to take their own lives as women. One significant factor in Ireland’s 
upward trend is alcohol consumption which rose by more than 50 per cent 
between 1981 and 2001. Alcohol is thought to be related to around half of all 
suicides and suspected suicides. 
 
Northern Ireland’s suicide trends bear closer resemblance to those in the Irish 
Republic than those in Scotland, Wales or England, and this holds not only for 
the overall trend but also for age profiles over time. Unemployment is 
associated with male suicide for all five jurisdictions. One important finding is 
the high concentration of increased male suicides in Northern Ireland after 
1998. Before 1998, no parliamentary constituency in Northern Ireland came 
anywhere near Scotland which had fourteen of the top twenty worst areas for 
Section 9 
 113 
suicides in the UK. But after 1998, North Belfast had gone from 319th to 11th 
place and West Belfast from 259th to 13th.   
 
Section 6 presented a detailed examination of suicide trends in Northern 
Ireland. According to the official statistics there was a sharp decline in 
suicides at the start of the conflict, followed by a broad upward trend since 
then. That trend becomes more definite in the 1990s, with younger men 
accounting for most of the change. It was also shown that proportionally 
firearms became more prevalent as a method of suicide during the conflict, 
but have recently declined in importance. 
 
It is this overall trend that has been used by a number of researchers to claim 
that there is a direct association between suicide and the conflict, and to 
suggest that the post-1998 rise in suicides is the result of a reduction in the 
high level of ‘wartime’ social cohesion . So central is this claim to the concerns 
of this review that the arguments and explanations surrounding it, as well as 
the data themselves, were carefully scrutinised. From the analysis of suicide 
method and accidental deaths data, evidence is presented that puts a serious 
question mark over the reliability of the suicide figures for the early years of 
the conflict and beyond. An alternative argument is put forward that ‘the 
troubles’ did affect suicide but not in the way that those who take the data for 
granted believe. More plausibly, the conflict affected the process of 
registration such that some suicides were recorded as ‘accidental deaths’ 
instead.  
 
Support for this argument comes from the fact that there is a highly significant 
inverse statistical relationship between suicides and accidental deaths from 
car crashes – the biggest category of accidental deaths – over the entire 
period 1967-1994. Car crashes are important because research has shown 
how they are implicated in the imitation of suicide. There was no relationship 
between suicides and the second biggest category – ‘falls’. This merits further 
investigation. 
 
The argument is further strengthened by the statistical relationships between 
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suicides and accidental deaths for poisoning. Strong inverse relationships 
were found between suicides by poisoning and accidental deaths recorded for 
poisoning. This was found for the short period covering the dramatic decline in 
recorded suicides in the early years of the conflict and over the period 1967-
1982. Again, this ought to be explored more closely along with the finding that 
there is a strong positive correlation between suicides by firearms and 
suicides by hanging from 1964 onwards. 
 
Hanging/suffocation is now the dominant method by which people take their 
own lives. Because the means and opportunity are generally available, 
hanging is the method of suicide used in institutional settings such as 
hospitals and prisons. Suicides of people in the care and custody of the state 
are among the most preventable of suicides. No-one should die in these 
circumstance. 
 
Having questioned the suicide/conflict deaths statistical relationship, the idea 
that the conflict increased social cohesion which then declined after the 
ceasefires must also be questioned. Reduced social cohesion leads to more 
suicides, the argument runs. The explanation may be neat and simple but it 
sits uneasily with the patterns of social and political division and change. Any 
generalisations around polarization and social integration need to take 
account of wide variations in experience. Further research is needed that can 
examine more precisely how suicide relates to neighbourhood characteristics 
and broader evidence on social change.  
 
As has been suggested, a ‘troubles effect’ may be operating in the last ten 
years or so, as people ask ‘what was it all for?’, and lose their political and 
social bearings in the uncertain world of transition to peace.  The familiar old 
world of the conflict, with its rules of engagement, its clear enemies and 
friends, and its rights and wrongs, gives way to doubts about crossing lines, 
unthinkable compromises, new risks, as well as, perhaps, to unfulfilled 
optimism. This puts community and religious leaders, political representatives 
and other significant contributors to political culture, in a special position in 
relation to suicide. People have to be convinced, and reminded, that the future 
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is worth it, especially when they are surrounded by everyday signs that it 
might not be.  
 
The ideas of ‘contagion’ and imitation have a long history in suicide research. 
This could be explored using a number of methods but it would be especially 
useful to work with those bereaved by suicide to find out more about ‘chains’ 
of related suicides, and to systematically collate the knowledge and 
experience of the bereaved and community leaders. It was suggested earlier 
that a ‘sociological autopsy’ is needed that sheds light on the successes and 
failures of the social processes of isolation, help seeking, and support that 
surround suicide. There is a basic lack of qualitative research exploring how 
families and local communities cope with depression, self-harming and 
suicide.  
 
A further aspect of the cultural context of suicide, of particular relevance to 
younger people, is the way in which suicide is represented, even celebrated, 
in popular culture. There are well over a thousand pop songs about suicide, 
while very few are explicitly opposed to suicide. Again, there appears to be 
very little research in this area.26 More shape could be given to work with 
mass media so as to reduce suicide imitation and to encourage good mental 
health. A greater understanding of how younger people use communications 
and other media is essential if they are to be engaged in relation to suicide 
awareness and prevention, and mental well-being more broadly.  
 
Then there are some much wider concerns raised by the research. Why is 
there such a reliance on anti-depressants and what explains the growth in 
prescribing? There is no clear evidence as to whether such increases reflect a 
greater recognition of mental health needs by professionals, relate to the 
marketing strategies of pharmaceutical companies, a change in the 
willingness of people to seek help, or a real change in the prevalence of 
mental illness.  
                                                
26  Jamieson (2003) argues that the rise in suicide among younger age groups in the United States is 
partly explained by the increased portrayal of suicide in American films and increased access to those 
films. 
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Similar questions can be asked about alcohol consumption. Why has it risen 
so much and what is to be done about it? 
 
Although specific risk groups have been defined in the suicide prevention 
strategy, the evidence base appears to be weak. A number of small projects 
need to be carried with those occupational and other groups who were in the 
frontline of conflict – including ex-prisoners – to provide better evidence of 
mental health needs and suicide risk. There is also the suggestion that the 
particular stresses of frontline activity have led to higher rates of physical 
illness and premature death. Again, this ought to be investigated. 
 
One of the issues around which there needs to be more clarity is ‘trauma’ and 
its transmission horizontally and through the generations. For instance it 
would be useful to gather up best practice from the range of practitioners and 
projects assessing and working with trauma. 
 
In conclusion, the evidence reviewed in this report points to a general 
conclusion that the conflict shaped the suicide problem in significant ways in 
the past and its legacies continue to influence the challenge of reducing 
suicide in the future. In particular, changes in the relationships between state 
bodies and the communities and individuals most affected by the conflict have 
impacted on the registration of suicides, the recognition of the suicide problem 
and the speed and nature of the responses to it. 
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Summary of recommendations for further research 
 
• A sociological autopsy of suicides is needed to shed light on the risk factors 
associated with social context, including community, neighbourhood and family 
experience. 
 
• There is a serious gap in qualitative research that might explore, for example, how 
families and local communities cope with depression, self-harming and suicide, and 
how knowledge of, and attitudes towards potential sources of help vary.   
 
• Research is needed that can examine more precisely how suicide relates to 
economic deprivation, neighbourhood characteristics, and broader evidence on social 
change, including changes in social isolation and integration. 
 
• The question of whether rural suicides are distinctive needs to be looked at. 
 
• There is a lack of systematic evidence concerning the prevalence of known risk 
factors for depression and suicide among those who were in the frontline of violence 
in past decades. A number of small projects need to be carried with relevant 
occupational and other groups – including ex-prisoners – to provide better evidence 
of mental health needs and suicide risk. Similar work needs to be carried out on 
premature death and physical illness for the same groups. 
 
• There is a need to gather up research data and best practice from the range of 
practitioners and projects assessing and working with conflict-related trauma. 
 
• There is a basic lack of research and information on self-harming among younger 
people which needs to be addressed. 
 
• The ideas of suicide ‘contagion’ and imitation need to be explored, particularly in 
relation to young people and the popular cultures that surround depression, anxiety 
and suicide.  
 
• Further research is needed to explain anti-depressant prescribing trends and to 
evaluate the efficacy of this intervention in relation to self-harming and suicide. 
 
• Similar questions need to be answered about alcohol consumption. Why has it risen 
so much and what is to be done about it? 
 
• Research is needed on suicides involving firearms. 
 
• The relationship between accidental deaths and suicides by particular methods, 
notably poisoning, needs to be researched in more detail. 
 
• The close statistical relationship between motor vehicle deaths and suicides needs 
further investigation. 
 
• The feasibility of establishing a parasuicide register for Northern Ireland in 
cooperation with the Cork-based National Parasuicide Registry should be 
investigated. 
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Appendix 
Method of Review 
 
The literature search was based on: 
 
a) Two specialist suicide journals, Archives of Suicide Research and Suicide and Life-
Threatening Behavior.  
 
b)  Known primary sources, tracking the work of key international experts and those working 
on mental health and suicide in British and Irish contexts. 
  
c)  Catalogues, libraries and databases, including: 
 
ArticleFirst, OCLC FirstSearch  
Applied Social Sciences Index and Abstracts 
ChildData 
Cochrane Library 
Digital Dissertations/Dissertation Abstracts and Index to Theses 
Economic and Social Data Service 
IBSS – International Bibliography of the Social Sciences 
JSTOR 
Medline  
ScienceDirect  
 
d) Government departmental sources.  
 
e) Parliamentary debates and records. 
 
f) EU and UN sources. 
 
g) Non-academic sources, such as work carried out by voluntary and community 
organizations.  
 
 
Literature selection 
 
Search results were reviewed on the basis of titles and abstracts. Items were selected or 
rejected according to judgements based on the three main questions described in the 
introduction.  Additional judgements were made regarding the type and range of data used, 
the time period involved and the standing of authors. General work on mental health and/or 
suicide providing overviews and international comparisons was prioritized. Specific work on 
war/conflict and mental health and suicide was also prioritized. Special attention was given to 
studies of suicide and suicide data relating to Britain and Ireland. 
 
The literature was organized thematically reflecting the structure of the final report. Some 
supplementary searching was carried out to address specific questions that arose during the 
writing of the first draft. 
 
 
Search terms  
 
The search terms used are listed below.  Primary terms are shown in bold. These were put 
into two groups: terms associated with mental health and those associated with Northern 
Ireland, war, conflict etc. Combining terms across the groups produced many repeat items. 
Secondary terms were combined with the primary terms in order to develop particular themes. 
Much of the resulting literature was too specific to the secondary topic (and countries of no 
direct interest or comparability) to inform the aims of the review. 
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Primary search terms 
List 1 List 2 
 
Northern Ireland 
Conflict 
Troubles 
War 
 
 
Anxiety 
Depression 
Mental Health 
Parasuicide 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
Self-harm 
Suicide 
Trauma 
 
Secondary search terms 
List 1 List 2 
 
Army  
Combatants 
Homicide  
Insecurity 
Killing 
Murder  
Peace 
Police 
Prison/ers 
Security 
Terrorism/t 
Victims 
Violence 
 
 
 
Alcohol abuse 
Child abuse 
Children 
Deprivation 
Divorce 
Drug abuse 
Ethnic 
Loneliness 
Poverty 
Sectarian 
Separation 
Sex abuse 
Social cohesion 
Social division 
Social fragmentation 
Social isolation 
Unemployment 
Well-being 
Young people 
Youth 
 
 
 
 
 
